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Abstract
Many facts are learned through the intermediation of individuals with special access
to information, such as law enforcement officers, officials with a security clearance, or
experts with specific knowledge. This paper considers whether societies can learn
about such facts when information is cheap to manipulate, produced sequentially, and
these individuals are devoid of ethical motive. The answer depends on an “information
attrition” condition pertaining to the amount of evidence available which distinguishes,
for example, between reproducible scientific evidence and the evidence generated in a
crime. Applications to institution enforcement, social cohesion, scientific progress, and
historical revisionism are discussed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Mediated learning
Many facts must be learned through agents with a specific expertise or access to information.
For example, the net benefits of a vaccine, the validity of a mathematical theorem, the
correct resolution of a crime, the historiography of an event, and the anthropogenic nature
of climate change cannot be directly verified or disproved by the average citizen, and there
is no “public epiphany” at which the truth is exogenously revealed to all. In these and many
others instances, citizens have no choice but to rely on intermediaries to learn anything about
the fact of interest, a situation that we will call mediated learning.
To succeed, mediated learning relies on the investigative efforts and truthfulness of agents
who can make false, misleading, or uninformed statements and are subject to biases, pressure,
ambition, and other considerations that may distort their behavior. In philosophy and
various social sciences, it is not uncommon to consider agents whose rule of behavior is to
act truthfully.1 By contrast, economists usually conceptualize truthful behavior as the result
of properly calibrated incentives, given to agents who are devoid of ethical motives.
This paper examines the feasibility of mediated learning through agents who are non-
ethical in the sense that their preferences do not directly depend on the fact to be learned.
For example, a prosecutor who cares only about convicting a defendant, regardless of his guilt,
is non-ethical according to this definition, while a prosecutor who cares about a defendant’s
1One branch of epistemic philosophy concerns the vulnerability of testimony, i.e., the fact that a speaker
can lie. This vulnerability is resolved through behavioral assumptions driven by norms of truthfulness and
principles of ethical behavior, such as Grice’s “cooperative principle” (H.P Grice (1975)). Computer scientists
consider the related problem of communication through potentially adversarial intermediaries, known in the
literature as the Byzantine generals problem (Lamport, Shostak, and Pease (1982)). This literature assumes
the existence of “loyal” generals, who obediently follow the communication protocol set out by the planner,
like Grice’s cooperative speaker. In sociology, it is common to assume the existence of pro-social norms that
coexist with and sometimes subsume individual incentives, and facilitate truthful behavior. See Granovetter
(2017) for a recent comparison of the paradigms in economics and sociology.
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actual guilt may be ethical.2
1.2 Information Attrition
The cornerstone of the analysis is the concept of information attrition, which captures the
idea that information about a given fact may be in limited supply. Consider the problem of
determining whether a given athlete used a banned substance during a given competition.
Controls typically consist of two blood (or urine) samples, “A” and “B”. If the first blood
sample, “A”, tests positive (suggestive of doping), the agency storing the second sample,
“B”, is then asked to test the second sample. At this point, the second sample is the only
direct source of evidence left about whether the athlete ingested a banned substance at the
event: the amount of evidence concerning this fact has shrunk, and each blood test reduces
the amount of information available in the case.
Information attrition may be caused by various factors. The first one, outlined above, is
that the process of learning about a fact sometimes requires transforming the evidence in a
way that prevents its use by subsequent investigators: the signals are disposable.3 Second,
information attrition may be due to the exogenous degradation of evidence: as time goes
by, evidence may deteriorate and become uninformative, for example due to poor storage
conditions. Third, information attrition may be caused purposefully by individuals who
tamper with or destroy some evidence. Finally, information attrition may stem from social
considerations. For example, if some researchers claim to have found that a particular drug
or treatment is harmful to human subjects or animals, it may become politically infeasible
to run more experiments.
2Caring about the fact to be learned is only a necessary condition for being “ethical.” For instance, a
prosecutor who wants to convict innocent defendants and acquit guilty ones can obviously not be called
ethical. This observation has no bearing on the formal analysis of this paper, which focuses on truth-
independent preferences. The case of mediated learning with ethical agents is discussed in Sections 2.2
and 4.
3Other examples of disposable signals include human subjects in experimental psychology: once a person
has been exposed to a particular experiment, this person is irremediably affected and no longer a good
subject for the same experiment. In particle physics and quantum mechanics, signal acquisition is subject
to the observer effect, whereby the observation of a phenomenon necessarily affects this phenomenon.
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1.3 Core Argument
To appreciate how information attrition affects mediated learning, let us reconsider the
blood-testing example and, specifically, the agency in charge of testing the second blood
sample. Since this agency possesses the only sample left, it can lie at no risk of being
contradicted. If, for instance, the agency stands to gain publicity from incriminating the
athlete, it can do so with impunity. If instead the agency benefits from exculpating the
athlete (perhaps due to the pressure exerted by some sport governing instance), it can also
do this at no cost. And if the agency is indifferent between incriminating the athlete and
absolving him, it has no incentive to incur the cost of running the test to begin with. In all
these cases, the second agency’s report is untethered to the truth.
Consider now the agency in charge of the first blood sample. Whatever report this agency
produces, the second agency’s report will not be based on the truth, as shown in the previous
paragraph. The first agency’s expected payoff is therefore independent of the content of its
blood sample. Like the second agency, it has no incentive to report the true content of its
blood sample, and incentives unravel. In this example, mediated learning is feasible only if
the agencies in charge of the tests care directly about the truth, i.e., only if they have ethical
preferences.4 When agencies are unethical, mediated learning is infeasible regardless of the
agencies’ material incentives.5
1.4 Reproducible Evidence and Incentive Design
Some investigations are immune to information attrition. Consider the question of deter-
mining whether a mathematical proof is correct. The proof remains available for anyone
to read no matter how many times it has been checked in the past. The unraveling ar-
gument of the previous section no longer applies and, as this paper shows (Theorem 2),
mediated learning by unethical agents is feasible provided that agents’ material incentives
are designed appropriately. The incentives that deliver successful mediated learning have an
intuitive structure: they reward an agent whose report is vindicated by subsequent findings
4In practice, the same laboratory is often in charge of storing and testing both samples, which may lead
to even more direct incentives problems, as in the case of nationally organized doping schemes.
5If there are three or more agencies, the results are the same when the agencies proceed sequentially,
regardless of the rule (e.g., majority rule) used to convict the athlete or incentives given to the agencies.
Section 4.2 discusses the case in which agencies move simultaneously as well as other monitoring structures.
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and punish him otherwise, and the magnitude of the rewards and punishments of each agent
depends on how surprising the agent’s report is relative to earlier beliefs about the state.
Information attrition does not arise, either, in scientific inquiries that rely on reproducible
experiments. For instance, no matter how many times physicists measure the weight of
an electron, the experiment can be replicated more times, ad infinitum. Knowledge based
on reproducible evidence can also, given the proper incentives, be protected from learning
failures caused by unethical agents.6
1.5 Analytical Challenge: Uncertain and Endogenous Attrition
To assess the scope of the argument illustrated by the blood-testing example, this paper
considers an analytical framework based on sequential learning through public reports that
generalizes the argument in three important ways. First, the supply of evidence available in
a case may be unknown a priori, even to investigators. Second, investigators may not know
how past investigators have affected the evidence available in the case. Third, the number
of potential investigators may be large and a priori unknown. For example, suppose that a
criminal has left behind ten pieces of forensic evidence, which may be discovered through
some costly investigative work. Investigators may not know a priori the exact number of
pieces left behind. Moreover, if an investigator inherits the case from a previous investigator,
he may not know how diligent the previous investigator has been and, hence, what fraction
of the evidence has already been discovered, fabricated, or destroyed. An investigator thus
faces exogenous and endogenous uncertainty concerning the amount of discoverable evidence.
This paper provides conditions on the probability distribution of the supply evidence,
taking into account the impact of each agent on the evidence, under which mediated learning
is feasible, and under which it is not (Theorems 1 and 2). When the necessary conditions
are violated, mediated learning by unethical agents is impossible in a strong sense: even
when i) there is an unbounded sequence of potential investigators, and ii) investigators’
incentives may be arbitrarily designed and administered without any commitment or agency
problem, there does not exist any equilibrium in which at least one investigator provides an
informative report with positive probability.
6The theory can be used to predict a correlation between the establishment of truthfulness oaths and
contexts where information suffers from attrition. For instance, it may explain why formal oaths are present
in court, but not in physical sciences. See Section 4.3.
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It is easy to design incentives for which mediated learning always fails or, given some
incentive structure, to construct an equilibrium for which mediated learning fails. The
main analytical challenge is to show that, in the presence of information attrition, mediated
learning fails for all incentive structures and all equilibria, in the strong sense that all agents
fail to reveal any truth about the fact with probability one.
Formally, this paper studies a sequential game of incomplete information in which the
state variable is a probability distribution over the set of evidence that remains to discover.
This probability distribution, defined on an infinite-dimensional space, represents agents’
belief about the supply of evidence and does not have simple monotonicity properties. For
instance, while the discovery of a piece of evidence may suggest that the remaining supply
of evidence is now smaller by one piece, this discovery may be interpreted as the tip of an
iceberg of evidence, pointing to many more pieces to discover. A discovery could also, if it
contradicts past reports, indicate that previous investigators have lied and that whatever
evidence they purported to have found (and thus “removed” from the supply of evidence)
was in fact fabricated, resulting in a more optimistic belief about the amount of evidence
that actually remains to discover.
An agent’s belief about the evidence supply affects his incentives directly, through the
probability that he discovers new evidence, as well as indirectly, through the probability
that subsequent agents also look for evidence. An agent cares about later agents’ beliefs
about the supply of evidence, their beliefs about subsequent agents’ beliefs, and so on.
Moreover, an agent can manipulate other agents’ beliefs by lying in his report.
Information attrition does not rule out per se the possibility that many agents work, or
that many pieces evidence remain to be discovered, but it suggests some negative correlation
between these events. To rule out the existence of an informative equilibrium, one has to
control the sequence of agents’ beliefs. This is achieved by showing that the probability that
an agent discovers evidence is probabilistically linked to the impact that this agent’s report
has on subsequent agents’ beliefs. This key link is established in Proposition 2.
1.6 Virtual Attrition Paradox. Application to Human Subjects
The necessary conditions are violated—and mediated learning is impossible—whenever in-
formation consists of disposable signals whose number has a bounded support, no matter
how large the bound. For example, suppose that there are initially 1000 signals. Success-
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ful learning requires at least one agent to use one of the signals, which can be incentivized
only if a subsequent agent uses (with positive probability) a second signal, which can be
incentivized only if a third agent uses a third signal with positive probability, and so on. To
incentivize mediated learning, agents must, with positive probability, reach a point at which
i) the probability that there remain 2 or more signals is arbitrarily low, ii) the probability
that some agent makes an informative report is positive. This is essentially the situation
faced by the two laboratories in the blood-testing example, and we know that these two
conditions are incompatible. Mediated learning must therefore fail down this path, which
causes incentives to unravel all the way back to the first agent and leads to a complete and
global failure of mediated learning.7
This yields the following paradox: when the supply of disposable signals is bounded,
mediated learning fails because agents anticipate that signals must eventually become scarce
with positive probability if mediated learning is successful. This anticipation destroys agents’
incentives to seek signals in the first place, implying that the scarcity never materializes: it
remains virtual and the supply of evidence remains intact as mediated learning fails entirely.
To appreciate the logical consequences of this paradox, consider a research question that
must be investigated through human subjects, such as a question in experimental psychology.
The experiment can be run only once on any given subject: exposure to the experiment
affects a subjects awareness, knowledge, and response to future experiments, as can be
most vividly intuited from experiments such as Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford prison experiment
(Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1972)).
In these cases, the more experiments are performed, the fewer the number of subjects
available for further experiments. Even when the pool of potential subjects is a large,
virtual attrition limits the scope for experimental replication and, hence, for incentivizing
researchers’ truthful behavior. Remarkably, Zimbardo later admitted to largely influenc-
ing the participants of his prison experiment, which significantly reduces the experiment’s
scientific value.8
7In herding models (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992)), social learning
can fail after so much public information has already been acquired that agents forgo their own information.
Here, by contrast, learning fails entirely from the first agent onward.
8Zimbardo (2007, p. 55) admits to directing the guards to handle the prisoners in the following terms:
“We can create boredom. We can create a sense of frustration. We can create fear in them, to some degree.
We can create a notion of the arbitrariness that governs their lives, which are totally controlled by us, by the
system, by you, me . . . They’ll have no privacy at all, there will be constant surveillance—nothing they do
7
2 Implications of the Theory
2.1 Political Consequences of Information Attrition
Consider the perspective of a citizen who is cynical in the sense that he does not trust
information intermediaries to behave ethically. In this citizen’s mind, all agents involved in
the learning process are purely motivated by unethical motives and are collectively aware of
this.
To see how information attrition affects the view of cynical citizens, let us first revisit the
blood-testing example. Given that the blood samples are subject to information attrition,
it is reasonable—indeed, rational—for a cynical individual to treat as uninformative any
finding reported by the blood-testing agencies, for the reasons explained above.9 As a result,
two citizens with cynical beliefs about agencies behavior and otherwise different views of
the world may rationally entertain completely different beliefs about whether a particular
athlete used banned substance, even after agencies have made their reports public: mediated
learning fails to convince citizens and bring their views closer.
Mediated-learning failures can have severe consequences for social cohesion and political
stability. When a politician is accused of corruption, for instance, the average citizen must
rely on declarations made by intermediaries, such as officials and journalists, to learn any-
thing about whether the corruption charge is true or, instead, an attempt to smear and
neutralize some politician. There is no deus ex machina available to lift all confusion and
finally reveal the truth to the public. Moreover, information attrition may be a concern
in these environments. In a corruption case, for instance, incriminating documents can be
destroyed and witnesses intimidated or eliminated.10
will go unobserved. They will have no freedom of action. They will be able to do nothing and say nothing
that we don’t permit. We’re going to take away their individuality in various ways . . . In general, what all
this should create in them is a sense of powerlessness. We have total power in the situation. They have
none.”
9Blood tests could in principle be certified by a third party, who would check wether the agency did its
job properly and thus increase the trust in its report. One would then have to understand the third party’s
incentives. This “monitoring the monitor” structure is discussed in Section 4.2.
10The same observations hold with regard to government agencies suspected of abusing their
power or violating some rules. Examples of evidence destruction by governmental agencies
abound, even in the world’s strongest democracies. In the Unites States, for instance, CIA di-
rector Richard Helms ordered in 1973 that all documents pertaining to the CIA’s infamous MK
8
Now let us consider citizens holding very different priors, perhaps based on their party
affiliation or ideology, about whether some politician was guilty of corruption or some gov-
ernmental agency abused its power. If these citizens are cynical, in the specific sense given
above, they can reject official statements and journalistic reports about the case and maintain
strong disagreements.
The theory thus provides an explanation for why even reasonable citizens may remain
divided on questions that are subject to information attrition.For such questions, the ab-
sence of trust in investigative institutions is rational and can perpetuate polarization. As
a corollary, this paper also proposes a specific mechanism to explain why eroding citizens’
trust in institutions harms social cohesion.
2.2 Ethical Necessity
The arguments presented so far bring us to one of the paper’s key motivating questions:
is ethical behavior necessary for society to function? Ethical necessity is not salient in
economic analysis, which typically focuses on “selfish” agents evolving within the boundary
of well-defined institutions, such as markets or democratic institutions, whose enforcement
is taken for granted.11 In reality, institutions cannot be taken for granted: if agents are
unethical, they may attempt to violate these institutions in various ways, and it is unclear
why agents should be presumed to act selfishly within the behavioral boundaries imposed
by these institutions but ethically respect these boundaries. Such an assumption amounts
to a “heroic dichotomy” that, at the very least, deserves closer inspection.
By focusing on mediated learning, this paper provides a tractable framework to study
ethical necessity.12 Since mediated learning is involved in the resolution of criminal cases,
Ultra program on mind-control experiments be destroyed (“An interview with Richard Helms”,
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no4/html/v44i4a07p_0021.htm).
In 2005, the CIA’s Director of Operations at the time ordered the destruction of all interrogation tapes of
Abu Zudaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri that featured “enhanced” interrogations (“Tapes by C.I.A.
Lived and Died to Save Image,” https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/washington/30intel.html.)
11Economists have studied various forms of non-selfish behaviors, such as pro-social behavior arising in
dictator and ultimatum games and various forms of altruism. Unlike earlier work, this paper does not study
ethical behavior per se, but the necessity of ethical behavior for society to function. Self-interest remains the
default assumption in most economic models and is deeply rooted in the discipline. For example, Edgeworth
(1881) observed that “self-interest is the first principle of pure economics.”
12The present framework relies on a sequential learning structure. One could consider alternative struc-
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political corruption, and the determination of other possible violation of institutions, suc-
cessful mediated learning is a necessary condition for society to function: whenever mediated
learning requires ethical behavior, so does society.
While ethical necessity has not been a salient issue in economics, it did receive some atten-
tion from economists.13 Hurwicz (2007) explicitly discusses the existence of “intervenors,”
which he defines as ethical monitors in a monitoring-the-monitor problem, and expresses
his personal belief in the existence of intervenors. Unlike the present paper, however, Hur-
wicz argues that intervenors are not needed for successful monitoring hierarchies.14 Hurwicz
describes an environment with three agents A,B,C, in which B monitors A’s actions, C
monitors B’s monitoring of A, A monitors C’s monitoring of B’s monitoring A, and so on.
This “Hurwicz triangle,” in which the infinite monitoring hierarchy is folded in loops going
through the three agents, which Hurwicz does not formally analyze, omits the possibility of
corruption across monitors, studied in Strulovici (2019).15
Holmstro¨m (1982) shares a similar concern for his analysis of moral hazard in teams, noting
in his conclusion that “another important issue relates to monitoring hierarchies. (...) The
question is what determines the choice of monitors; and how should output be shared so as
to provide all members of the organization (including monitors) with the best incentives to
perform?”
tures. For example, a central agency may ask several intermediaries to seek and report the truth simultane-
ously and independently of one another. Under this parallel structure, the incentives of such a centralized
agency must however also be scrutinized, which reintroduces a sequential element. This and other designs
are discussed in Section 4.
13For instance, Myerson (2006) shows that in a federalist democracy, the existence of some virtuous politi-
cians can guarantee that democracy succeeds either at a national or a provincial level, whereas democracy
can fail at both levels when such politicians are absent. By contrast, Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) describe
an information aggregation environment in which if all agents are purely concerned with achieving the social
optimum, there always exist equilibria in which the optimum is not achieved whereas if all agents are also
(but not only) concerned with their individual recommendation being followed, this uniquely selects the
socially optimal equilibrium.
14Rahman (2012) proposes an approach that is well suited for repeated monitoring tasks, such as controls
used for airport security or in sting operations: a principal can ask agents to violate the rules on purpose
to check whether these violations are caught by the monitor. Such violations are detected “for free” by the
principal since he instigates them. The approach is well suited when violations can be faked at little social
cost, the principal has commitment power, and collusion between the principal and agents is impossible.
15Levine and Modica (2016) consider a similar structure, in which agents in a group take some initial action,
then verify the action taken by their neighbor, then verify the earlier verification task of their neighbors, and
so on.
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Ethical necessity is implicit in Becker and Stigler’s (1974) study of wrongdoing and malfea-
sance by enforcement officers. The authors assume the existence of exogenous signals about
the behavior of enforcement officers. The existence of a reliable second level of monitoring
is thus taken for granted, which raises the question of how these signals are generated.16
2.3 Historical Revisionism
Historical revisionism is another instance of mediated learning, in which information attrition
plays an important role. Understanding historical events is of obvious importance, not only to
learn lessons from the past but also to assess claims based on such events, such as territoriality
or reparation claims. Mediated learning is necessary because citizens cannot directly verify
historical events.17 They must rely on experts and officials to access and correctly interpret
archives, artifacts, and other sources of information. Information attrition is both exogenous
(e.g., witnesses die) and endogenous (e.g., documents may be destroyed on purpose).
To give a concrete example,18 consider the fire of the German parliamentary building
(Reichstag) on February 27, 1933. The importance of this event can hardly be overstated.
The Nazis, who had lost seats in the previous parliamentary election, claimed that the
fire had been caused by communists and used this event to pressure president Hindenburg
into imposing martial law on Germany (the “Reichstag fire decree”) and arrest and weaken
communists. This allowed the Nazi’s to form a majority coalition after the March 5, 1933
parliamentary elections, consolidated Hitlers power, and led to the Enabling Act.
While communist involvement in the fire has long been rejected, there was until recently
a consensus among mainstream historians that the Reichstag fire had not been caused by
the Nazis. Fritz Tobias, one of the most respected historians on this subject in the postwar
16Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) explicitly study the enforcement of market institutions. They
consider the role of law merchants to discipline trade in medieval Europe, and they do consider some of the
law merchants’ incentives to lie and take bribes.
17This point is obvious with regard to events that took place before citizens’ lifetime. Even with regard to
contemporaneous events, aggregating information and forming a global picture of an event is a highly complex
task that requires expertise, time, and a special access to information. The pitfalls of such information
aggregation have been famously illustrated by Stendhal’s La Chartreuse de Parme whose protagonist, Fabrice
del Dongo, takes part to the Battle of Waterloo with the Napoleonic army but construes a completely
erroneous version of the battle.
18Huq (2018) discusses similar, very recent examples, in which the possibly false threats of terrorism or
coups were used to weaken democratic institutions and shift power to more authoritarian regimes.
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period, published a series of articles purporting to show that van der Lubbe, the person who
was convicted for the arson, had acted alone.19 Historians accepted Tobias’ version of the
event until 2001, when two historians studying Gestapo archives came to the conclusion that
it was a group of SA officers who had set the fire (Bahar and Kugel (2001)). Hett (2014) used
recent scientific advances to convincingly argue that it would have been impossible for a single
individual to set the fire. In 2019, an affidavit written in 1955 by former SA Hans-Martin
Lennings discovered in Tobias’ files was published by RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland,
which stated that Lennings and other SAs had driven van der Lubbe from an infirmary to
the Reichstag when the fire had already started, effectively setting up van der Lubbe.
Information attrition took several forms: all but one of the SA officers who were allegedly
involved in the Reichstag fire were killed (and, hence, silenced) during the Night of the Long
Knives; van der Lubbe was beheaded in 1934 for his alleged role in the arson; and any
forensic evidence about the Reichstag fire has been long gone. Furthermore, Fritz Tobias hid
Lennings’ affidavit, which contradicted Tobias’ single perpetrator theory, until his death.20
To this day, the strongest case for Nazi involvement thus seems to come from Lennings’
affidavit, and hence boils down to one man’s statement. It is unclear what Lennings’ moti-
vation for involving the SA may have been, except perhaps for setting the record straight.
For observers who doubt Lennings’ statement, the question of who set the Reichstag on fire
may reasonably represent a failure of mediated learning. Lutjens (2016) believes that “the
continuous reshaping of the Reichstag fire by those with a stake in the matter has fragmented
the truth beyond recovery.”
2.4 Existence and Observability of Ethical Agents
The arguments developed so far assume that agents are known to be unethical. Without this
knowledge, mediated learning can be achieved if agents put sufficiently high weight on the
probability that other agents are ethical. To see this, let us consider once more the blood-
testing example. If the first agency and citizens all believe that the second agency behaves
ethically, the first agency can be incentivized to test and truthfully report the content of the
first blood sample because its finding can be compared to the second agency’s finding, which
19The articles were published in Der Spiegel under the title ,,Stehen Sie auf, van der Lubbe!,” in 1959 and
1960, in issues 43 to 52.
20Tobias is suspected of having tried to protect former Nazi officers after the war and had some incentive
to dissimulate the Nazis’ role in the Reichstag fire.
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all believe to be truthful, and the first agency can be held accountable for any discrepancy.
More generally, any agent can be incentivized to behave truthfully as long as the agent
believes that subsequent agents are likely to provide informative reports.
Conversely, if some agent is ethical, but other agents believe that he is not, mediated
learning can fail just as when all agents are unethical, for two reasons: First, the findings
of the ethical agent are (perhaps, wrongly) believed to be uninformative. Second, precisely
because the agent’s findings are believed to be uninformative, the findings cannot be used
to incentivize other agents to behave truthfully. Therefore, mediated learning requires that
agents believe that other agents behave ethically with high enough probability.
The theory thus provides a specific mechanism for why eroding trust in institutions is
damaging: society may need everyone to believe in the existence of ethical agents in order
to sustain ethical behavior. Events that erode the strength of this belief can have severe
consequences for the feasibility of mediated learning and the functioning of society.21 It may
be empirically difficult to distinguish between agents who have ethical preferences and agents
who merely behave like ethical agents. The belief in ethical behavior can be self-fulfilling.
2.5 Organization of Remaining Sections
Section 3 describes the formal model and results. In the baseline model, all agents must
incur a cost (which may be arbitrarily small, but strictly positive) for acquiring information.
The model is then is then extended to allow for the existence of witnesses, who receive
information for free about the state of the world and are subject to idiosyncratic, private
shocks that affect their reporting preferences. Section 4.1 describes the relation between the
concept of hard evidence, information attrition, and intermediation. Section 4.2 discusses
alternative investigation designs and settings. Section 4.3 explores how to foster truth-
dependent preferences among investigators. All results are proved in the Appendix.
21Belief in ethical behavior gets rid of virtual attrition, but not of real attrition. For example, if the second
blood-testing agency is, in fact, unethical, it cannot be incentivized to tell the truth: real attrition interrupts
mediated learning. But if everyone erroneously believes that the second agency is ethical, then the first
agency may be incentivized to behave truthfully.
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3 Formal Analysis
3.1 Baseline Model
The fact of interest, ω ∈ Ω, must be inferred from a sequence S = (s1, . . . , sK˜) of signals,
each of which takes values in some finite signal space Σ. The sequence S and its length
K˜ ≤ ∞ are stochastic.
In each round i ≥ 1, a new agent arrives and makes two decisions: First, the agent
privately chooses between seeking a signal (“working”) at cost c > 0 and doing nothing
(“shirking”). Second, the agent publicly sends a message mi from some finite message space
M . The agent can randomize his decisions.
Let Si denote the sequence of signals that remain to discover at the beginning of round i
(in particular, S1 = S). If the agent in round i (hereafter, “agent i” or simply “i”) works
and Si 6= ∅, then i discovers some element of Si with probability λ ∈ (0, 1]. The discovered
signal is denoted si.
22’23 With probability 1−λ, i discovers no signal. If Si is empty, i surely
discovers no signal.
For simplicity, we will not model the possibility that agents destroy signals without discov-
ering them, or that signals disintegrate exogenously. These additional forms of information
attrition would only strengthen the paper’s impossibility results (Theorem 1 and Theo-
rem 3).24 The extension is more complex when some agents, such as witnesses, can discover
signals for free. This extension is analyzed explicitly in Section 3.4.
After the information-seeking stage, i sends a report mi whose distribution in ∆(M) can
arbitrarily depend on what (if anything) i has observed in the information-seeking stage and
on the reports mi−11 = (m1, . . . , mi−1) made by previous agents.
Entering round i+ 1, we have Si+1 = Si if i did not discover any signal. If i discovered a
22The subscript i denotes the signal discovered in round i (if any), which should not be confused with the
ordering of signals in the sequence S, which is indexed by a superscript.
23No constraint is imposed on how likely each element of Si is of being discovered by agent i. This
likelihood could depend arbitrarily on i’s identity and on Si, and the discovery of some specific signal may
contain information about other signals in Si that depends on i’s identity. Moreover, Theorem 1 can be
generalized to the case in which the probability λ of discovering a signal is nondecreasing in the length of Si.
24The framework of the possibility result (Theorem 2), in which the number of signals is geometrically
distributed, can be interpreted as being the result of an exogenous decay of evidence.
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signal, then Si+1 is a subsequence of Si with length |Si+1| = |Si| − 1.
Let m = (m1, m2, . . .) denote the sequence of reports made by all agents. The realized
utility of agent i is given by
Ui = Vi(m,ω)− c1i works (1)
where Vi takes values in some compact interval [−P,R].
We will say that agent i is non-ethical if the function Vi is independent of ω, which captures
the idea that i does not care directly about the truth. In this case, Vi may be defined on the
restricted domain MN. Vi can depend arbitrarily on the entire sequence m = (m1, m2, . . .).
In particular, the impossibility results presented in this paper hold regardless of whether
Vi is an exogenously given utility function or one that is specifically designed (or, at least,
influenced) by a regulator or social planner.
To illustrate the various forms that Vi may take, note that i could be punished if his
report is contradicted by subsequent investigators, and/or rewarded if his report differs
from past investigators’ (as in a journalistic scoop). Vi may aggregate a discounted stream
of rewards and punishments.25 The formulation captures situations in which i’s utility is
affected by reports indirectly through the actions that these reports trigger. For example,
i could be a prosecutor at a trial, whose outcome a(m) ∈ {‘guilty’, ‘not guilty’} depends
on the statements of all agents involved in the case. If i is non-ethical, his utility may be
modeled by Vi(m) = R × 1{a(m) = ‘guilty’}, as in Landes (1971). In general, i’s realized
utility could depend stochastically on other agents’ reports. For example, suppose that the
number of investigators is stochastic. We can model this by interrupting mediated learning
at some stopping time τ , in which case i’s utility depends only on (m1, . . . , mτ ). This and
similar variations, such as randomizing the order of investigators or how investigator j’s
report affects i’s utility, is easily encompassed by the model.
Agents have a common prior about the distribution of S. The equilibrium concept is
(weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.26
25For example, if i receives utility vi,j(m1, . . . ,mj) in round j ≥ i and discounts future utility with some
factor δ < 1, then
Vi(m) =
∑
j≥i
δj−ivi,j(m1, . . .mj).
26The impossibility results in this paper hold for stronger concepts of equilibrium, such as sequential
equilibrium. Reciprocally, the equilibrium constructed to prove the positive result, Theorem 2, is a sequential
equilibrium.
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3.2 Main Results
For each k ≥ 1, let F k = Pr(|S| ≥ k) denote the prior probability that there are at least k
signals to discover at the beginning of the investigation process.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is informative if at least one agent works with positive prob-
ability, and uninformative otherwise.
Uncovering any modicum of information about S (and, hence, ω) with positive probability,
no matter how small, suffices to qualify an equilibrium as “informative.” The following
theorem shows, however, that informative equilibria fail to exist when information is subject
to attrition in a specific sense.
Theorem 1 Given fixed parameters (R,P, c, λ), there exist strictly positive thresholds {F
¯
k}k≥1
with the following property:
All equilibria are uninformative if there exists k ≥ 1 such that F k < F
¯
k.
For an informative equilibrium to exist, the support of |S| must therefore be unbounded: if
not, FK = 0 for someK, which violates the threshold conditions regardless of the parameters
(P,R, c, λ). This only a necessary condition, however: even if |S| has an unbounded support,
the thresholds mentioned by Theorem 1 imply that the survival function F k = Pr(|S| ≥ k)
cannot decrease too fast for mediated learning to be feasible.
When the survival function F k decreases at most at a geometric rate, there are instances of
the model and utility functions {Vi}i∈N for which mediated learning is feasible, as indicated
the next theorem.
Theorem 2 For any ρ ∈ (0, 1] and λ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an instance of the model and
utility functions {Vi}i≥1 for which the distribution of S satisfies F k = ρk−1F 1 for all k ≥ 1
and an informative equilibrium exists.
To illustrates this positive result, the next section focuses for expositional simplicity on
the case of reproducible evidence, which corresponds to ρ = 1 (the supply of signals is
unlimited), and shows that mediated learning can be made arbitrarily precise as long as the
rewards and punishments are high enough.
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3.3 Reproducible Evidence
Suppose that S consists of infinitely many signals taking binary value, “H” or “L”.27 The
signals are conditionally i.i.d.: there is an unknown parameter ω ∈ {H,L}—the underlying
fact of interest—such that each signal s˜ satisfies Pr(s˜ = “H”|ω = H) = Pr(s˜ = “L”|ω =
L) = π ∈ (1/2, 1), and the signals are independently distributed conditional on ω. Agents’
message space is chosen to be binary: mi ∈ {‘‘H”, “L”} for all i.
For expositional simplicity, we assume in this section that λ = 1, which means that every
agent who works surely discovers a signal.28
In the equilibrium that we consider, it is always in an agent’s interest to follow his signal
if he acquired one. The relevant pure strategies are: i) work at cost c > 0 and report one’s
signal (mi = si), and ii) shirk and send a message mi ∈ {‘‘H”, “L”} at no cost.
Let p0 = P (ω = H) denote the prior about ω before the investigation process. For any
given equilibrium, let γi denote the probability that i works and pi denote the probability
that ω = H , both conditional on the past reports mi−11 .
Proposition 1 For any thresholds p− and p+ such that 0 < p− < p0 < p+ < 1, there
exist P,R > 0, utility functions {Vi}i≥1 taking values in [−P,R], and thresholds p
¯
, p¯ such
that 0 < p
¯
< p− and 1 > p¯ > p+ for which the following strategy profile constitutes an
equilibrium: γi = 1 if pi ∈ (p
¯
, p¯) and γi = 0 otherwise.
The state ω can thus be learned with arbitrary precision if the rewards and punishments
used to incentivize agents are high enough. In equilibrium, agents work with probability 1
until the posterior belief becomes extreme enough, at which point learning stops.
Since pi is a martingale and each signal has the same level of informativeness, pi must
exit [p
¯
, p¯] with probability 1 in the candidate equilibrium. Incentives are provided as follows:
if i reported “H”, he gets a reward if p¯ is reached and a punishment if p
¯
is reached, and
27The construction used to prove Theorem 2 is almost identical for ρ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ = 1 and the results
are qualitatively unchanged. The key is that there remain signals to discover with probability at each stage
of the sequence with a probability that is bounded below away from 0. Moreover, if the number of initial
signals is generated according to a geometric distribution and each signal decays at some fixed rate, the
construction used to prove Theorem 2 still works because the probability of discovering new signals remains
uniformly bounded away from zero.
28The construction used to prove Theorem 2 is very similar if instead λ < 1.
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vice versa. These rewards and punishment depends on the belief pi before i’s report. If
pi was very close to one of the boundaries and i’s report takes the posterior away from
this boundary, i gets a high reward if the belief process ends up exiting through the other
boundary (a low probability event) and a very mild punishment if the belief process ends up
crossing the nearby boundary.
3.4 Witnesses
Consider now the addition of witnesses who differ from previous agents in two aspects:
• Witnesses discover a signal for free.
• They are subject to preference shocks that affect which report they prefer to send.
In each round i ≥ 1, agent i can be an investigator, identical to the agents of the baseline
model, or a witness. Whether i is an investigator or a witness is public information.
If i is an investigator, the structure of i’s round, information, and utility is as in the
baseline model. If i is a witness, he receives at no cost a signal si ∈ Si at the beginning of
the round, where Si is the set of signals remaining at the end of round i− 1. In particular,
i can be a witness only if Si is nonempty. If i is a witness, the sequence Si+1 of available
signals at the end of round i satisfies |Si+1| = |Si| − 1.
At the beginning of round i, the probability ϕi that i is a witness is zero if Si = ∅ and can
take any value in [0, 1] otherwise, and depend on past reports mi−11 .
29
In principle, a witness’ signal could be informative about the number of signals that remain
to discover and, in particular, about whether information attrition is an issue for subsequent
agents.30 This would significantly weaken the relevance of the initial belief about the supply
of information, on which previous theorems are based.
We rule out this possibility and focus on the case in which a witness’ signal never increases
29For example, there could be a fixed subset N ⊂ N of rounds such that ϕi = 1i∈N (which puts a lower
bound on the support of |S|). Alternatively, there could be a fixed time T beyond which all witnesses have
appeared, so that ϕi ∈ (0, 1) for i ≤ T and ϕi = 0 for i > T . In general, the number of witnesses and the
timing of their appearance may be stochastic and depend on past reports. This captured by allowing ϕi to
depend arbitrarily on past reports and on calendar time.
30For example, |S| could be a finite or infinite with equal probability, and a witness’ signal could reveal
whether the latter is true, in which case mediated learning may be feasible, as described by Theorem 2.
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one’s expectations about the total number of signals. This is achieved as follows: the se-
quence S of signals is obtained by, first, generating an infinite sequence S∞ of signals, which
may exhibit any arbitrary correlation between one another and, second, by truncating this
sequence at some integer-valued random variable K˜ that is independently distributed from
S∞. Agents observe signals in the order of the sequence. Thus, writing S = (s1, . . . , sK˜) (us-
ing superscripts to avoid confusion with the signals discovered in round i, which are denoted
with subscripts), suppose that qi signals have been uncovered by the beginning of round i,
so that Si = (s
qi+1, sqi+2, . . . , sK˜). If i discovers a signal si, then necessarily si = s
qi+1 and
Si+1 = (s
qi+2, . . . sK˜).
Moreover, we assume that K˜ has an increasing hazard rate, i.e., Pr(K˜ = k)/Pr(K˜ ≥ k)
is increasing in k.
Assumption 1 The total number of signals K˜ has an increasing hazard rate.
Intuitively, this assumption guarantees that the more signals have been discovered, the more
likely it is that there are no signals left to discover.
After observing his signal si, witness i sends a report mi ∈M . His realized utility has two
parts:
Ui(m) = Vi(m) + ǫi(mi)
where Vi(m) plays the same role as investigators’ utility function, and ǫi(mi) is a shock
affecting i’s preferences.
Assumption 2 The random variables {ǫi(mi)}mi∈Mi are independently distributed from one
another and from all other variables in the model. They have density functions {fi,mi}mi∈Mi
that are bounded above by some constant f¯ .
The bound f¯ plays a role for witnesses that is similar to the ratio 1/c for investigators.
Intuitively, the opportunity cost for i to send message mi instead of m
′
i (or vice versa) is of
order 1/f¯ , as explained in Lemma 8.
An informative equilibrium is defined as before: there is at least one agent (investigator
or witness) who produces an informative message with positive probability. Continuation
informative equilibria are defined analogously.
Theorem 3 There exist strictly positive thresholds {F
¯ k
}k≥1 such that if F k < F
¯
k for some
k ≥ 1, there does not exist any informative equilibrium.
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4 Discussion
Learning through intermediaries fails if the following conditions hold jointly: i) intermediaries
do not care about the truth, ii) information is subject to attrition, iii) there is no exogenous,
public revelation of the truth at any future time, and iv) intermediaries proceed sequentially.
This result holds for a general class of utility functions, for all equilibria, in the strong sense
that nothing at all is learned about the state of the world, and despite the fact that agent
incentives can be administered without any further agency problem: whatever rewards and
punishments are promised to the agents as function of reporting histories can be perfectly
enforced.
This is not to say that mediated learning fails in practice. This paper’s impossibility results
may be viewed as a reference point: to succeed, mediated learning must break at least one of
the four conditions above. In particular, mediated learning can succeed if some intermediaries
are motivated by the desire to seek the truth, or by a belief that other intermediaries have
such a motivation.
Several ways out are discussed below.
4.1 Escaping Attrition with Hard evidence
In some cases, signals are not disposable. Consider for instance the video footage of a crime,
in which the criminal is clearly identifiable. Such a video can be revisited numerous times
without being altered, and conceptually resembles the case analyzed earlier of reproducible
evidence.
Even this kind of evidence has some limitations. First, the evidence can deteriorate over
time. Second, it need not be perfectly reliable. For example, the video footage could be
fabricated, as exemplified by the emergence of baffling deepfakes. In this case, the signals
that investigators receive, no matter how numerous, are only as reliable as the original source
that generates them.
The use of DNA testing also illustrates this issue. The amount of usable DNA samples on a
crime scene is finite and thus subject to virtual attrition (Section 1.6). The procedure of DNA
testing involves a replication phase, such as PCR amplification or DNA cloning, which creates
more “evidence” that can be stored and verified by subsequent investigators. However,
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DNA samples can also be synthesized, i.e., literally “fabricated,” to match any desired
DNA profile.31 A laboratory can store artificial DNA, or even more simply, it can store
DNA samples that were erroneously or malevolently taken outside of the crime scene and
presented as coming from the scene.32 Ultimately, agents who come later in the investigation
can either test the DNA material that previous laboratories have left them, which may be
the outcome of manipulation, or look for new DNA samples, which brings us back to the
problem of information attrition.
The role of technology on mediated learning is complex and deserves a separate explo-
ration. For example, DNA testing, video footage, and other technological advances have
increased the set of reliable evidence. However, technology can also be used to manipulate
evidence and do so more anonymously than before, increasing the reliance on experts and,
hence, on mediated learning.
4.2 Alternative Designs
Several remedies may be considered to address the unraveling results of Theorems 1 and 3.
First, agents could be asked to investigate and report their findings simultaneously, a struc-
ture that we may call parallel monitoring. Second, agents could investigate past investigators.
Third, in some cases, such as criminal cases, agents can in principle be incentivized by the
perspective that their findings have an influence of subsequent crimes or events. Finally, the
same agents could be called to make statements repeatedly over time. These possibilities
are examined in turn.
1. Parallel monitoring and weak implementation with a centralized authority
In applications such as historical revisionism, it is realistic to assume that agents make
their statements sequentially. It is nonetheless natural to consider, from a mechanism-design
perspective, the case in which several agents simultaneously and independently investigate
the fact of interest and report their findings to some central authority. For example, blood-
31Frumkin, Wasserstrom, Davidson, and Grafit (2010) show the possibility of creating saliva or blood
samples with the desired DNA. The authors, as well as subsequent work by other researchers, show that
identifying methylation patterns in DNA samples can help distinguish synthetic and natural DNA, although
such identification is challenging.
32A famous example is the “Phantom of Heilbronn,” a presumed serial killer whose DNA was found on 40
crime scenes over a fifteen-year span in Germany, Austria, and France. The DNA turned out to belong to a
woman working in the factory that made the cotton swabs used to collect DNA samples.
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testing laboratories could be asked to test their respective samples independently from each
other and report their findings simultaneously to some overseeing agency. The laboratories
would be rewarded if their findings are match and punished if they don’t.33
An immediate concern with this solution stems from the incentives of the central authority.
If the authority has a material interest in a specific outcome (which cannot be ruled out,
especially in politically charged investigations), it can secretly help agents coordinate on some
report or influence the agents’ reports in various ways. In order to avoid this, the central
agency must be itself monitored, which brings us back to the sequential monitoring problem.
In the blood-testing example, if laboratories must report their findings simultaneously, there
is no recourse for an athlete accused of doping, particularly if laboratories can coordinate
their response.
In some cases, parallel monitoring may be difficult to implement: it may be difficult, for
instance, to send multiple investigators on a crime scene to independently interrogate witness
and collect evidence, without the investigators being able to communicate, either directly or
through witnesses and possibly coordinate. Moreover, when the evidence is limited supply
(such as the weapon of a crime), such a limitation creates negative correlation in investigators’
reports, since at most one of them can discover the evidence (weapon).34
Finally, successful parallel monitoring can coexist only with other equilibria, many of which
are uninformative. Indeed, there always exist equilibria in which monitors coordinate on a
predetermined sequence of reports. Among these equilibria, successful parallel monitoring,
when it is feasible, may be non-robust. Even small amounts of strategic uncertainty about
other monitors can suffice to destroy the informative equilibrium.35
2. Monitoring the Monitor
In the applications discussed so far, each agent makes a statement about a particular
question (e.g., whether an athlete used a banned substance, or who committed a crime).
The agents themselves could be investigated. In this case, the subject of study of each agent
evolves over time: agent 1 investigates the initial question, agent 2 investigates agent 1’s
33The academic refereeing process has reporting features that resemble the parallel-monitoring design,
although the incentives for referees are different and arguably more complex than a mere coordination
motive.
34The deleterious impact of negative correlation on the informativeness of agents with a coordination
motive is a central finding in Pei and Strulovici’s (2020) analysis of strategic abuse.
35This idea is explored in ongoing joint work with Harry Pei.
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treatment of the initial question, agent 3 investigates agent 2’s investigation and so on. Such
a sequence is called a “monitoring hierarchy.” In his analysis of monitoring, Hurwicz (2007)
considers a similar hierarchy, except that the number of agents is finite and the monitoring
chain cycles repeatedly across the a fixed number of agents. A first conceptual difficulty with
this approach concerns the simultaneity and complexity of these monitoring tasks: agents are
supposed to conduct an infinite amount of monitoring tasks and are indirectly the subject
of the tasks that they are investigating.
Even if we allow an infinite sequence of distinct agents, each of which is tasked with
investigating the previous agent in the sequence, another issue emerges: what if an agent
who discovers evidence about the agent he was monitoring can hide or destroy the evidence
in exchange for a payment from the guilty agent? Such a transfer amounts to a local form
of corruption among nearby agents. In a separate paper, I show that even this local form
of corruption may suffice to unravel agents’ incentives (Strulovici (2019)). Intuitively, the
tension comes from two considerations. First, in order for a monitor to accurately report his
finding about the previous agent, the monitors punishment if he lies and makes a wrongful
accusation must be higher than his reward for claiming to have discovered wrongdoing by
the previous monitor. Second, a monitor must get a higher reward if he finds evidence
against the agent that he was investigating, relative to the punishment that this agent gets
when punished. Otherwise, there is a transfer form the guilty agent to the monitor that
improves both agents’ payoff. Combined, these observations imply that the chain of rewards
is unbounded and, hence, unsustainable.
3. Repeated Setting
When mediated learning concerns the identification of a criminal and opportunities to
commit crime are repeated over time, it is a priori possible that investigators care about the
truth indirectly, through the impact that their findings have on citizens’ future behavior.
Suppose that a citizen’s decision to commit crime depends on whether his past actions were
accurately called by past investigators: for example, a citizen who was wrongfully accused of
committing crime in the past or who was wrongfully acquitted for crimes that he did commit
may be more likely to commit crime in the future. In this setting, investigators could in
principle have an endogenous incentive to report accurate findings. Provided that players are
sufficiently patient, this kind of strategy profile could a priori be used to incentivize accurate
reporting.
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However, for this argument to work, a citizens strategy must depend on his private history,
where public history consists of official findings about citizens’ past actions and a citizen’s
private history records his actual past actions. In order for a citizen’s private history to
affect his decision of whether to commit crime, the citizen must be made indifferent between
committing crime and abstaining from it, a knife-edge condition that is violated if, for
instance, citizens are subject to small private shocks affecting their benefits from committing
crime.36
4. Alternating Statements
Finally, one could ask a fixed set of agents to take turns investigating and reporting on
the question of interest. The key difference with the baseline model is that agents now have
private information about what they did in the past, which affects how they interpret the
declarations of other agents. If an agent has discovered disposable signals in the past, he
knows that other agents have fewer signals to discover. The analysis becomes more complex
because agents’ decisions now depend on their beliefs about the amount of evidence left,
about other agents’ beliefs about the amount evidence, their belief about agents’ beliefs
about their beliefs about the amount of evidence left and so on. While information attrition
is likely to have a similar effect as in this papers model, confirming this intuition and exploring
this question is left for future research.
4.3 Designing Truth-Dependent Preferences: Oaths, Capitalism,
and Popular Juries
A more direct approach to improving mediated learning is to increase the salience of truth-
dependent preferences.
This may be achieved by fostering agents’ ethical sense, from inculcating an ethical edu-
cation and culture to strengthening trust in institutions and developing effective vetting and
selection processes for key learning responsibilities.
Professional oaths, from the Hippocratic oath in medicine journalistic oaths such as Walter
Williams’ Journalist’s Creed (Farrar (1998)) also aim at eliciting ethical behavior. This
paper suggests a positive correlation between the need of oaths in various professions and
the severity of information attrition problems in these professions.
36The argument is somewhat similar to the section on witnesses in this paper.
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Even if a limited fraction of agents is swayed by such oaths, this may in principle suffice
for incentivizing truthful behavior by other agents. Studying the mechanisms and behavioral
features through which ethical agents can incentivize mediated learning is beyond the scope
of this paper, but it is easy to conceive of simple examples: suppose that an agent, who is
known to truthfully seek and report the truth is commonly know to appear in round N > 1.
This agent’s report provides reliable information, akin to an exogenous public signal about
the state of the world, which can be used to incentivize all agents coming in rounds i < N .37
Another approach is to design society in a way that increases information mediators’ ma-
terial dependence on the truth, i.e., gives them “skin in the game.” Eliciting information
from agents about a scientific fact or the social value of a new product or process is easier
when the agents stand to gain financially from this information, which may broadly inter-
preted as capitalistic incentives. Thus interpreted, the theory offers a new perspective on
the “virtue” of capitalism relative to systems in which agents have low-powered incentives.38
The theory also emphasizes that violations of the rules of capitalism (or of any system, for
that matter) may be difficult to detect and reveal truthfully, and thus suggests a potential
tradeoff between the incentives provided within a given a economic or political system and
the incentives required to guarantee that the system itself is obeyed.
A final angle to attack mediated learning failures is to democratize the learning process
by enlarging the pool of potential information intermediaries. Large pools can increase
the alignment—real or perceived—between the intermediaries and society as a whole, in
contrast to the baseline model of the paper, in which society’s objective is dissociated from
the intermediaries’. Large pools of intermediaries are conceivable when the expertise required
to learn the fact of interest is limited. The institution of popular juries may be viewed as
one application, which trades off intermediaries’ expertise with their representativeness of a
more global and diffuse body of stakeholders.
37Even if agent N has only a small probability p < 1 of behaving ethically, his report may still be used to
incentivize agents in earlier around as long as these agents’ rewards and punishments are of order 1/p.
38A large literature emphasizes capitalism’s ability to reduce moral hazard problems relative to socialistic
systems. See Myerson (2007) and Tirole (2006) for a review of relevant papers and corporate-finance models
capturing this idea. The question of incentive compatibility and its relation to various economic systems
is at the heart of Leonid Hurwicz’s development of mechanism design (Hurwicz (1973)). Compared to the
literature, this paper is concerned with both moral hazard and adverse selection since the object of mediated
learning is to elicit effort from investigators as well as truthful revelation of investigators’ findings.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
For any i, k ≥ 1, let F ki = Pr(|Si| ≥ k | mi−11 ) denote the probability that there remain at
least k signals to discover at the beginning of round i given past reports mi−11 . The prior
probability F k that S contains at least k signals at the beginning of the investigation process
satisfies F k = F k1 .
A.1 Preliminary Results
Agents’ decisions are invariant with respect to a uniform translation in their gross utility
(i.e., the utility that they get before taking into account their effort cost). Therefore, we can
assume without loss of generality that their gross utility takes values in some interval [0, R].
Moreover, since R is an upper bound on payoffs, it can always be increased to guarantee
that R > c, which we will assume without loss of generality.
Let γi denote the probability that i works given m
i−1
1 .
Lemma 1 γi > 0 only if F
1
i ≥ cR > 0.
Proof. Let V wi denote i’s expected gross utility if he works. V
w
i may be decomposed in
terms of i’s expected gross utility V¯i if he works and there exists some signal left to be found,
and his expected gross utility V w,∅i if he works but there is no signal left to be found (Si = ∅):
V wi = F
1
i V¯i + (1− F 1i )V w,∅i .
Conditional on Si = ∅, i’s expected gross utility if he works is the same as his expected
gross utility V s,∅i if he shirks and uses the same reporting strategy as he does after working
and finding nothing: conditional on i’s report (whatever it is), the distribution of reports by
subsequent agents is identical since there is no signal left to be found. Therefore, V w,∅i = V
s,∅
i .
Furthermore, we also have V¯i ≤ R since R is the maximum possible gross utility.
Therefore, i’s net utility Uwi from working, including the cost of working, satisfies
Uwi ≤ F 1i R + (1− F 1i )V s,∅i − c.
Similarly, i’s utility Usi from shirking satisfies
Usi ≥ F 1i × 0 + (1− F 1i )V s,∅i = (1− F 1i )V s,∅i
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where the inequality comes from the fact that 0 is a lower bound on i’s realized gross utility.
Comparing the previous two equations shows that shirking strictly dominates working if
F 1i R− c < 0. 
Given any round i and report history mi−11 such that γi > 0, let
• V ∗i denote i’s maximal expected gross utility if he shirks, where the maximum is taken
over all possible messages mi ∈M ;
• f 0i = 1− F 1i denote the probability that Si = ∅ at the beginning of round i.
Lemma 2 Suppose that λ < 1. If i works and finds nothing and sends message mi, his
expected gross utility V wi (∅, mi) satisfies
V wi (∅, mi) ≤ V ∗i +
f 0i R
1− λ
for all mi.
Proof. For any sequence S ′′ of signals, let ∆i(S ′′) denote the probability that Si = S ′′ con-
ditional on report history mi−11 and ∆
∅
i (S
′′) denote the probability that Si = S ′′ conditional
on i working and finding nothing. Bayesian updating implies that, for any S ′′ 6= ∅,
∆∅i (S
′′) = ∆i(S ′′)
(1− λ)
(1− f 0i )(1− λ) + f 0i
and, for S ′′ = ∅,
∆∅i (∅) = ∆i(∅)
1
(1− f 0i )(1− λ) + f 0i
.
This implies that
∆∅i (S
′′)−∆i(S ′′) = − λf
0
i ∆i(S
′′)
(1− f 0i )(1− λ) + f 0i
(2)
for S ′′ 6= ∅ and
∆∅i (∅)−∆i(∅) =
λ(1− f 0i )∆i(∅)
(1− f 0i )(1− λ) + f 0i
. (3)
Let Vi(mi, S
′′) denote i’s expected gross utility conditional on i producing evidence mi and
on Si+1 = S
′′. Notice that mi1 = (m
i−1
1 , mi) and Si+1 completely determine the distribution
of reports {mj}j>i. Therefore, Vi(mi, S ′′) is the same regardless of whether i has worked or
shirked. Agent i’s expected gross utility conditional on i) working, ii) finding no signal, and
iii) producing message mi, is
V wi (∅, mi) =
∑
S′′∈S
Vi(mi, S
′′)∆∅i (S
′′),
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whereas his expected gross utility if i shirks and sends message mi is
V si (mi) =
∑
S′′∈S
Vi(mi, S
′′)∆i(S ′′)
because i has learned nothing from shirking and thus holds the same belief as his prior belief
at the beginning of round i. Combining these expressions, we get
V wi (∅, mi)− V si (mi) =
∑
S′′∈S
Vi(mi, S
′′)(∆∅i (S
′′)−∆i(S ′′)). (4)
Since Vi(mi, S
′′) ∈ [0, R] for all mi and S ′′, combining (4) with (2) and (3) yields
V wi (∅, mi)− V si (mi) ≤
R∆i(∅)λ(1− f 0i )
(1− f 0i )(1− λ) + f 0i
.
Since λ < 1, the denominator is bounded below by 1 − λ. Since ∆i(∅) = f 0i , the numerator
is bounded above by Rf 0i . This yields
V wi (∅, mi) ≤ V si (mi) + f 0i
R
1− λ ≤ V
∗
i + f
0
i
R
1− λ,
which proves the lemma. Intuitively, this results means that if f 0i is negligible relative to
(1 − λ), then i’s expected gross utility after working and finding nothing cannot be much
higher than if i had shirked, because finding nothing in this case merely reveals that i was
unlucky and otherwise conveys little else information. 
For each round i and subset M˜i ⊂ M of messages, we introduce several probabilities condi-
tional on mi−11 .
• γi(M˜i): probability that i produces a report in M˜i conditional on working;
• gi(M˜i): probability that i finds a signal and produces a report in M˜i conditional on
working;
• di(M˜i): probability that i finds no signal and produces a report in M˜i conditional on
working.
Finally, let M+i denote the set of messages mi that are followed by an informative continu-
ation equilibrium at round i+ 1.
Lemma 3 Agent i’s expected gross utility conditional on working has the following upper
bound. If λ < 1, then
V wi ≤ V ∗i + di(M+i )
f 0i R
1− λ + gi(M
+
i )R.
If λ = 1, then
V wi ≤ V ∗i + di(M+i )R + gi(M+i )R.
31
Proof. For eachmi ∈M , let V wi (mi) denote i’s expected gross utility conditional on working
and sending message mi and M
−
i denote the set of messages mi after which no j > i ever
works, so that M =M+i ∪M−i and M+i ∩M−i = ∅.
We have
V wi =
∑
mi∈M−i
γi(mi)V
w
i (mi) +
∑
mi∈M+i
γi(mi)V
w
i (mi). (5)
For the first term, note that i’s expected utility conditional on reporting mi and on no j > i
ever producing real evidence does not depend on whether i worked or shirked: either way,
the distribution of the reports {mj}j>i is independent of the set of signals that remain in the
case. Letting, as in the previous lemma, V si (mi) denote i’s expected gross utility conditional
on shirking and sending message mi, we thus have V
w
i (mi) = V
s
i (mi) for all mi ∈M−i . Since
V ∗i = maxmi∈M V
s
i (mi), the first term in (5) is bounded above by γi(M
−
i )V
∗
i .
For the second term, we have γi(mi) = di(mi) + gi(mi) and
γi(mi)V
w
i (mi) ≤ di(mi)V wi (∅, mi) + gi(mi)R,
where we used the fact that i’s expected gross utility conditional on working, finding a signal,
and reporting mi is bounded by R.
Combining these observations yields
V wi ≤ γi(M−i )V ∗i + gi(M+i )R +
∑
mi∈M+i
di(mi)V
w
i (∅, mi). (6)
If λ < 1, Lemma 2 implies that V wi (∅, mi) ≤ V ∗i + f
0
i R
1−λ . Summing over all mi ∈M+i , we get∑
mi∈M+i
di(mi)V
w
i (∅, mi) ≤ di(M+i )V ∗i + di(M+i )
f 0i R
1− λ. (7)
Since γi(M
−
i ) + di(M
+
i ) ≤ γi(M−i ) + γi(M+i ) = 1, combining (6) and (7) proves the lemma
when λ < 1.
If λ = 1, using in (6) the fact that V wi (∅, mi) is bounded above by R directly proves the
lemma. 
For each round i, we define another set of probabilities conditional on mi−11 :
• βi: probability that i discovers a signal (before observing whether i works, i.e., viewed
from the beginning of round i);
32
• βi(M˜i): probability that i discovers a signal and sends a message in M˜i;
• αi(M˜i): probability that i shirks and sends a message in M˜i;
• δi(M˜i): probability that i produces a report in M˜i conditional on working and finding
no signal;39
• F ki+1(mi): probability that there remain at least k signals at the beginning of round
i+ 1 given reports mi1 = (m
i−1
1 , mi).
Proposition 2 Let C(λ) = 2R/(cλ(1 − λ)) for λ < 1 and C(1) = 2R/c. The following
inequality holds for all constants C ≥ C(λ), round i, and integer k ≥ 1 such that F ki >
CF k+1i :
βi ≤ C
Ei
[
(F ki − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
F ki − CF k+1i
. (8)
Proof. The right-hand side of (8) is increasing in C over the range of C that satisfy the
condition F ki −CF k+1i > 0. Therefore, if (8) is satisfied for any C such that F ki −CF k+1i > 0,
it is also satisfied for any C ′ ≥ C such that F ki − C ′F k+1i > 0. The proposition thus follows
if we show the inequality for C(λ).
First, we show that the claim holds if βi = 0. In this case, i must shirk with probability
1 (if not, Lemma 1 implies that Si is nonempty with positive probability and, hence, that
βi > 0). Since i shirks with probability 1, there is no belief update between rounds i and i+1.
Therefore, F ki = F
k
i+1(mi) for any message mi that i sends in equilibrium. The right-hand
side of (8) is thus equal to zero and (8) is satisfied.
Now suppose that βi > 0 or, equivalently, that γi > 0: i works with positive probability. We
consider two cases, distinguished by whether working is likely to lead to the discovery of a
signal and, under i’s equilibrium strategy, to a message in M+i .
Case 1: gi(M
+
i ) ≥ c2R . By definition, we have
βi = γiλ(1− f 0i )
(in particular, βi ≤ γi) and
βi(M
+
i ) = γigi(M
+
i ).
39Note that δi(M˜i) ≥ di(M˜i), where di(M˜i) was defined before Lemma 3.
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Since gi(M
+
i ) ≥ c/2R, this implies that
βi ≤ γi ≤ 2R
c
βi(M
+
i ). (9)
Therefore, (8) will follow if we prove that βi(M
+
i ) is bounded above by
Ei
[
(F ki −F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
F ki −CF k+1i
for C = 2R/c.
For each mi that i may send in equilibrium and k ≥ 1, Bayesian updating implies that
F ki+1(mi) =
F ki (αi(mi) + γi(1− λ)δi(mi)) + Φ(mi)
αi(mi) + γi((1− F 1i + F 1i (1− λ))δi(mi) + βi(mi)
, (10)
where Φ(mi) is the probability that i) i works, ii) i discovers a signal, iii) i sends report mi,
and iv) there remain at least k signals at the beginning of round i+ 1.
Let pi(mi) denote the probability that i produces report mi conditional on m
i−1
1 : pi(mi) is
the denominator of (10). Rearranging (10) and simplifying, we have
F ki (βi(mi) + γi(1− F 1i )λδi(mi)) = (F ki − F k+1i (mi))pi(mi) + Φ(mi) (11)
Since γi(1− F 1i )λδi(mi) ≥ 0, summing the previous equation over mi ∈M+i yields
F ki βi(M
+
i ) ≤ Ei
[(
F ki − F ki+1(mi)
)
1mi∈M+i
]
+
∑
mi∈M+i
Φ(mi). (12)
Since Φ(mi) = Ei
[
1|Si|≥k+1 1i works, discovers a signal, and reports mi
]
, we have
∑
mi∈M+i
Φ(mi) ≤
∑
mi∈M+i
Ei
[
1|Si|≥k+1 1i works and reports mi
]
= Ei
[
1|Si|≥k+1 1i works and reports mi ∈ M+i
]
≤ Ei
[
1|Si|≥k+1 1i works
]
= F k+1i γi, (13)
noting, for the last equality, that the event that i works, which has probability γi, depends
only on mi−11 and is thus independent of the event {|Si| ≥ k + 1} conditional on mi−11 .
Combining this with (12) yields
F ki β(M
+
i ) ≤ Ei
[
(F ki − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
+ F k+1i γi. (14)
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Since gi(M
+
i ) ≥ c/2R, we have β(M+i ) = γigi(M+i ) ≥ γic/2R. Inequality (14) then yields
β(M+i ) ≤
1
F ki − 2R/cF k+1i
Ei[(F
k
i − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i ]. (15)
Combining this with (9) yields (8) for C(1) = 2R/c.40 Since C(λ) ≥ C(1) for all λ ∈ (0, 1],
the monotonicity noted at the beginning of the proof yields the desired conclusion for C(λ).
Case 2: gi(M
+
i ) <
c
2R
. We prove that γi is bounded above by the right-hand side of (8) for
C = C(λ). Since γi ≥ βi, this will yield the desired conclusion.
Intuitively, in Case 2 the probability of discovering a signal that, together with i’s equilibrium
message strategy, triggers subsequent work is too low to incentivize i to work. The only way
of incentivizing i to work is therefore for him to signal by his message that he found nothing
through work. For this to happen, the probability f 0i that there remains no evidence must
be high enough. We will us this fact to obtain a bound on γi.
From Lemma 3, if gi(M
+
i ) < c/2R, i’s utility from working is bounded above by
Uwi = V
w
i − c ≤ V ∗i + di(M+i )
f 0i R
1− λ −
c
2
if λ < 1, and by
Uwi ≤ V ∗i + di(M+i )R−
c
2
if λ = 1. Therefore, working is optimal only if di(M
+
i )f
0
i ≥ c(1 − λ)/2R when λ < 1 and
only if di(M
+
i ) ≥ c/2R when λ = 1.
Summing (11) over M+i and using (13) and f
0
i = 1− F 1i yields
F ki βi(M
+
i ) + γiF
k
i δi(M
+
i )f
0
i λ ≤ Ei
[
(F ki − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
+ F k+1i γi. (16)
For λ < 1, we have di(M
+
i )f
0
i ≥ c(1−λ)/2R. Since δi(mi) ≥ di(mi) for all mi (by definition)
and F ki βi(M
+
i ) ≥ 0, (16) implies that
γi ≤
Ei
[
(F ki − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
F ki cλ(1− λ)/2R− F k+1i
.
Multiplying the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side by C(λ) yields the result.
40Note that the proposition’s assumption that F ki − C(λ)F k+1i > 0 implies that F ki − 2Rc F k+1i > 0 since
C(λ) ≥ C(1) regardless of λ.
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For λ = 1, we have di(mi) = δi(mi)f
0
i for all mi and hence δi(M
+
i )f
0
i λ = di(M
+
i ), which is
greater than c/2R as noted earlier. Therefore, (16) implies that
γi ≤
Ei
[
(F ki − F ki+1(mi))1mi∈M+i
]
F ki (c/2R)− F k+1i
.
Multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand side by C(1) yields the
result. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds by induction on k. Lemma 1 already proves the claim for k = 1 with
F
¯
1 = c/R. Now suppose that the claim holds for some k ≥ 1: there exists a threshold
F
¯
k > 0 such that any informative continuation equilibrium in round i satisfies F ki ≥ F¯
k.41
We will show that there is a constant F
¯
k+1 > 0 such that the continuation equilibrium can
be informative only if F k+1i ≥ F¯
k+1.
For any ω ∈ [0, 1], let F k(ω) = inf{F ki ∈ [0, 1] : γi > 0, F k+1i ≤ ω} where the infimum is
taken over all on-path histories and all equilibria of the game, and is by convention equal to 1
if no informative equilibrium exists for which F k+1i ≤ ω. Note that F k(ω) is by construction
nonincreasing in ω.
Let F
¯
= inf{ω : F k(ω) < 1}. F
¯
is the smallest value of F k+1i for which an informative
continuation equilibrium exists (or the infimum of such values, if the infimum is not reached).
Our objective is to show that F
¯
> 0. Let F¯ k = limω↓F
¯
F k(ω), i.e., the right limit of F k(·)
at F
¯
. This limit is guaranteed to exist because F k(·) is nonincreasing. Roughly put, F¯ k is
the smallest probability of having at least k signals among informative equilibria that have
the smallest possible probability having at least k + 1 signals left.
Also let ε > 0 denote any small constant such that Fˆ k = F k(F
¯
+Gε) ≥ F¯ k
1+η
, where G > 0 is a
large constant and η > 0 is a small constant determined at the end of the proof independently
of k.42 Since F¯ k is the right-limit of F k(·) at F
¯
, such an ε exists. Moreover, since all ε′ ∈ (0, ε)
41Note that while the theorem is stated at round 0, it applies equally well to all continuation equilibria
since the thresholds {F
¯
k}k≥1 depend only on the parameters (R,P, c, λ), which are constant throughout the
game.
42For example, one can choose G and η so that
√
G = max{64R3/(λc3), 12R/c} and η = 1/√G, as
explained at the end of this proof.
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also satisfy the condition, we can choose ε such that
ε ≤ 1
2
(
Fˆ k
G
)2
. (17)
By definition of F
¯
, there exists at least one informative continuation equilibrium for which
F k+1i ∈ [F¯ , F¯ + ε]. Moreover, by definition and monotonicity of F
k(·), there exists an
informative continuation equilibrium among those for which F ki ≤ F¯ k + ηFˆ k.
Consider such a continuation equilibrium, which starts at round i, say, and suppose by
contradiction that
F
¯
= 0. (18)
Let A denote the event that F k+1j ≤ Gε for all j ≥ i.
Lemma 4 i assigns probability at least 1− 1/G to A.
Proof. For j ≥ i, let F¯ k+1j denote the probability assigned at the beginning of round j
(i.e., conditional on mj−11 ) that there remain at least k+1 signals at the beginning of round i
(fixed). The process {F¯ k+1j }j≥i is nonnegative and bounded above by 1, and it is a martingale
by the law of iterated expectations and the fact that j’s filtration grows finer as j increases.
Moreover, F¯ k+1i = F
k+1
i ≤ ε.
Doob’s martingale inequality therefore implies that for any J ≥ i, Pr(maxi≤j≤J F¯ k+1j ≥
Gε) ≤ Ei[F¯ k+1i ]
Gε
≤ 1/G. The event A¯∞ defined by {maxj≥i F¯ k+1j ≤ Gε} is the intersection of
the events A¯J = {maxi≤j≤J F¯ k+1j ≤ Gε}. Therefore, Pr(A¯∞) = limJ→∞ Pr(A¯J) ≥ 1− 1/G.
Finally, we note that F¯ k+1j ≥ F k+1j for all j ≥ i, because the true number of remaining signals
only decreases over time and thus whatever signals remained at the beginning of round imust
have contained the signals that remain at the beginning of round j, so Pr(A) ≥ Pr(A¯∞) ≥
1− 1/G. 
Conditional on A, F k+1j ≤ Gε for all j ≥ i. Moreover, if round j belongs to an informative
continuation equilibrium, we have F kj ≥ F k(F k+1j ) ≥ F k(Gε) = Fˆ k. Given any positive
constant C, this implies that for informative continuation equilibrium starting in round j,
F kj − CF k+1j ≥ Fˆ k − CGε ≥ Fˆ k/2 > 0 (19)
provided that G ≥ C, where the last weak inequality comes from (17). The condition G ≥ C
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will be satisfied by fixing C at the level C(λ) stated in Proposition 2 and then choosing G
large enough. (A specific value of G is given at the end of the proof.)
Let Aj denote the event that F k+1l ≤ Gε for all integers l such that i ≤ l ≤ j. The
events {Aj}j≥i form a decreasing sequence that converges to A as j →∞. Moreover, Aj is
measurable with respect to the information available at the beginning of round j.
From Proposition 2, we have
βj ≤ Ej
[
C(F kj − F kj+1(mj))1mj∈M+j
F kj − CF k+1j
]
(20)
over Aj.
Let Bj denote the event that mj ∈M+j . Bj is adapted to mj1, i.e., known at the beginning of
round j+1. Notice that if Bj does not occur, it means by definition that no l > j ever works
(i.e., mj1 is followed by an uninformative continuation equilibrium). This implies that the
sequence of events {Bj}j≥i is decreasing path by path and, hence, that the sequence {1Bj}j≥i
is nonincreasing.
Since Aj is measurable with respect to mj−11 , equations (19) and (20) imply that for j ≥ i+1
Ei+1[1Ajβj] ≤ Ei+1
[
Ej
[
1Aj
2C(F kj − F kj+1)1Bj
Fˆ k
]]
.
The law of iterated expectations then implies that
Ei+1[1Ajβj] ≤ Ei+1
[
1Aj
2C(F kj − F kj+1)1Bj
Fˆ k
]
=
2C
Fˆ k
Ei+1[1Aj (F
k
j − F kj+1)1Bj ]. (21)
Summing (21) over all j ≥ i+ 1, we obtain
Ei+1
[∑
j≥i+1
1Ajβj
]
≤ 2C
Fˆ k
Ei+1
[∑
j≥i+1
1Aj1Bj (F
k
j − F kj+1(mj))
]
. (22)
Since the indicator functions on the right-hand side are nonincreasing in j for j ≥ i+1, path
by path, there must be a first (possibly infinite) round J for which the product of indicators
is zero:
J = inf{j ≥ i+ 1 : 1Aj1Bj = 0}
with the convention that J = +∞ if the set is empty. In words, J is either the first round in
which F k+1j exceeds Gε, or the last round at which the continuation equilibrium is informative
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(which implies that γj ≥ 0 for all j > J), whichever occurs first.43
Consider first the paths for which J is finite. The argument of Ei+1[·] on the right-hand side
of (22) then reduces to
J−1∑
j=i+1
(F kj − F kj+1) = F ki+1 − F kJ .
Consider now paths for which J is infinite. In this case, the argument of Ei+1[·] on the
right-hand side of (22) is equal to
∞∑
j=i+1
(F kj − F kj+1) = lim
J→∞
J∑
j=i+1
(F kj − F kj+1) = lim
J→∞
{F ki+1 − F kJ+1} = F ki+1 − lim
J→∞
F kJ .
Notice that the limit is well defined because F kJ is a nonnegative supermartingale.
44 For
notational consistency, we will call this limit F kJ , regardless of whether J is finite.
Combining these observations with (22), we conclude that
Ei+1
[∑
j>i
1Ajβj
]
≤ 2C
Fˆ k
(
F ki+1 − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
.
We have βj = γjF
1
j λ. Moreover, Lemma 1 shows that γj > 0 only if F
1
j ≥ c/R. This
implies45 that γj ≤ gβj where g = Rλc and hence that
Ei+1
[∑
j≥i+1
1Ajγj
]
≤ 2Cg
Fˆ k
(
F ki+1 − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
. (23)
Let Z denote the event that at least one agent j > i works and πi+1(mi) = Pri+1(A ∩ Z),
43J is not a stopping time with respect to the filtration {Fj}j≥i+1 generated by public histories
{mj−11 }j≥i+1: at the beginning of any round j at which j works with positive probability, it is unknown
whether j will be the last round in which the agent works. The proofs below do not use the optional sampling
theorem or the strong Markov property.
44The argument is similar to the one used to prove Lemma 4. For any fixed j, let F¯ k+1l denote the
probability assigned by l ≥ j to there remaining at least k + 1 signals at the beginning of round j. The
process {F¯ k+1l }l≥j is a martingale in j, by the law of iterated expectations and the fact that that l’s
filtration grows finer as l increases. Moreover, F¯ k+1l ≥ F k+1l for all l ≥ j, because the actual number of
remaining signals only decreases over time. Therefore, we have F k+1j = F¯
k+1
j = Ej [F¯
k+1
j+1 ] ≥ Ej [F k+1j+1 ]. This,
together with the fact that F k+1l is uniformly bounded and measurable with respect to the information at
the beginning round l, shows that it is a supermartingale.
45The inequality clearly holds if γj = 0.
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i.e., the probability that A and Z both occur conditional on mi1. We have
πi+1(mi) = Pri+1
(
1A
∑
j>i
1j works ≥ 1
)
≤ Ei+1
[
1A
∑
j>i
1j works
]
=
∑
j>i
Ei+1
[
1A1j works
]
≤
∑
j>i
Ei+1
[
1Aj1j works
]
=
∑
j>i
Ei+1
[
Ej
[
1Aj1j works
]]
=
∑
j>i
Ei+1
[
1AjEj
[
1j works
]]
=
∑
j>i
Ei+1
[
1Ajγj
]
.
The first equality comes from the fact that Z is identical to the event {∑j>i 1j works ≥ 1}.
The first inequality comes from the fact that 1A
∑
j>i 1j works is nonnegative and integer
valued, so that its expectation exceeds the probability that it is strictly positive. The second
equality is an application of Tonelli’s theorem. The second inequality comes from the fact
that A ⊂ Aj and, hence, 1A ≤ 1Aj . The next equality comes from the law of iterated
expectations and the next one comes from the fact that Aj is measurable with respect to
the information at the beginning of round j. The last equality comes from the definition of
γj.
From (23) and Tonelli’s theorem, this implies that
πi+1(mi) ≤ 2Cg
Fˆ k
(
F ki+1 − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
. (24)
Let F k,ri (mi) denote the probability that there are at least k signals left conditional on i
working and reporting mi, and for any signal si let F
k,w
i (si) denote the probability that there
are at least k signals left conditional on i working and discovering si. F
k,w
i (si) represents i’s
belief after discovering si, while F
k,r
i (mi) represents what i+ 1 would believe conditional on
knowing that i worked and observing report mi.
Let Ni = {mi : F k,ri (mi) > (1 + η)F ki }.
Lemma 5 i) γi(Ni) ≤ 12ηG2 , ii) for mi /∈ Ni, πi+1(mi) ≤ 2CgFˆ k
(
(1 + η)F ki − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
.
40
Proof. i) Let S ′i = {si : F k,wi (si) > F ki }, and, for each si, let γ′i(si) (resp. β ′i(si)) denote
the probability that i discovers si given that he works (resp., the probability that i works
and discovers si). Also let γ
′
i(si|k + 1) (resp. β ′i(si|k + 1)) denote the same probabilities
conditional on |Si| ≥ k + 1.
We have for all si
F k,wi (si) =
F k+1i γ
′
i(si|k + 1)
γ′i(si)
=
F k+1i β
′
i(si|k + 1)
β ′i(si)
where the second equality comes from β ′i(si) = γiγ
′
i(si) and β
′
i(si|k + 1) = γiγ′i(si|k + 1).
Therefore, F k,wi (si) > F
k
i only if β
′
i(si) < β
′
i(si|k + 1)F k+1i /F ki .
We have
∑
si∈S′i F
k+1
i β
′
i(si|k + 1) ≤ γiF k+1i . Therefore, the probability β ′i(S ′i) that i works
and finds a signal in S ′i satisfies
β ′i(S
′
i) =
∑
si∈S′i
β ′i(si) ≤ γi
F k+1i
F ki
.
Since β ′i(S
′
i) = γiγ
′
i(S
′
i), we have
γ′i(S
′
i) ≤
F k+1i
F ki
≤ ε
Fˆ k
,
since F k+1i ≤ ε and F ki ≥ Fˆ k. From (17), the right-hand side is bounded above by Fˆ
k
2G2
.
For any mi, let q(mi) denote the probability, conditional on i working and sending report
mi, that i has discovered a signal si ∈ S ′i, and let σ(si|mi) denote the probability that i
discovered si given that he worked and reported mi. We also let si = ∅ denote the event
that i did not find anything, σ(∅|mi) denote the probability that i found nothing given that
he worked and reported mi, F
k,w
i (∅) denote the probability that there at least k signals
conditional on i working and finding nothing. We have
F k,ri (mi) =
∑
si∈Si
σ(si|mi)F k,wi (si)
=
∑
si∈S′i
σ(si|mi)F k,wi (si) + σ(∅|mi)F k,wi (∅) +
∑
si 6=∅,si∈Si\S′i
σ(si|mi)F k,wi (si)
By construction, F k,wi (si) ≤ F ki for all si in the last term. Moreover, we have F k,wi (∅) ≤ F ki ,
as is easily checked:46 intuitively, finding nothing always increases the probability that there
46Formally, for k ≥ 1, we have F k,wi (∅) = F
k
i
(1−λ)
(1−F 1
i
)+F 1
i
(1−λ)
= F ki
1−λ
(1−F 1
i
)+F 1
i
(1−λ)
≤ F ki .
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are no signals remaining to be found. Finally, the first term is bounded above by σ(S ′i|mi) =
q(mi). Therefore,
F k,ri (mi) ≥ (1 + η)F ki ⇒ q(mi) + (1− q(mi))F ki ≥ (1 + η)F ki
⇒ q(mi) ≥ ηF ki .
To conclude, note that
∑
mi
γi(mi)q(mi) = Pr(si ∈ S ′i|mi−11 , i works) ≤
Fˆ k
2G2
The left-hand side is bounded below by γ(Ni)ηF
k
i . Since F
k
i ≥ Fˆ k, this implies that
γ(Ni) ≤ 1
2ηG2
.
ii) F ki+1(mi) is a convex combination
47 of F ki and F
k,r
i (mi), we have F
k
i+1(mi) ≤ (1 + η)F ki
for all mi /∈ Ni. From (24), this implies that
πi+1(mi) ≤ 2Cg
Fˆ k
(
(1 + η)F ki − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
for all mi /∈ Ni. 
Let Ti = {mi : F k+1i+1 (mi) ≥
√
Gε}.
Lemma 6 i) Pri+1(A) ≥ 1− 1/
√
G for all mi /∈ Ti, ii) γi(Ti) ≤ 1/
√
G.
Proof. i) If mi /∈ Ti, we have F k+1i+1 ≤
√
Gε. Using this inequality in Lemma 4 instead of
F k+1i ≤ ε and repeating its argument applied to round i+ 1, we conclude that i+ 1 assigns
probability at least 1− 1/√G to A whenever mi /∈ Ti.
ii) Let F k+1,ri (mi) denote the probability that there are at least k + 1 signals left at the
beginning of round i + 1 conditional on i working and reporting mi. F
k+1
i+1 is a convex
combination of F k+1i and F
k+1,r
i (mi). This, together with the fact that F
k+1
i ≤ ε and the
47F ki+1(mi) is the probability that i + 1 assigns to there being at least k signals left upon observing mi.
If i + 1 knew that i didn’t work and simply sent message mi, this belief should be F
k
i since mi conveys no
additional information. And if i + 1 knew that i produced mi through working and then reporting mi, his
updated belief should be F k,ri (mi). Since i + 1 doesn’t observe i’s action, in general F
k
i+1(mi) is a convex
combination of these two posteriors, where the weights corresponds to the probability assigned by i + 1 to
i fabricating or working conditional on observing mi. This fact is straightforward to check using Bayesian
updating.
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definition of Ti, shows that mi ∈ Ti only if F k+1,ri (mi) ≥
√
Gε. Let T ′i denote the set of
messages mi for which the last inequality holds. As noted, Ti ⊂ T ′i .
Since i’s prior probability that there are at least k + 1 signals left is F k+1i ≤ ε, the law of
iterated expectations implies that the probability F¯ k+1,ri (mi) that there were at least k + 1
signals left at the beginning of round i conditional on i working and finding mi must satisfy
Ei[F¯
k+1,r|working] =
∑
i∈Mi
γi(mi)F¯
k+1,r
i (mi) = F
k+1
i ≤ ε.
Using Markov’s inequality, this implies that Pr(mi : F¯
k+1,r
i (mi) ≥
√
Gε| i works) ≤ ε√
Gε
=
1/
√
G. Since also F¯ k+1,ri (mi) ≥ F k+1,ri (mi), we get γi(T ′i ) ≤ 1/
√
G. Since Ti ⊂ T ′i , this shows
that γi(Ti) ≤ 1/
√
G. 
Let V w denote i’s expected gross utility if he works and V w(mi) denote his expected gross
utility conditional on working and reporting mi. We have
V w =
∑
i∈Mi
γi(mi)V
w(mi)
≤ (γi(Ni) + γi(Ti))R +
∑
mi /∈Ni∪Ti
γi(mi)V
w(mi)
≤
(
1
2ηG2
+
1√
G
)
R +
∑
mi /∈Ni∪Ti
γi(mi)V
w(mi) (25)
Moreover,
V w(mi) = Pr(Z|mi1)V w(mi|Z) + Pr(Zc|mi1)V w(mi|Zc). (26)
Conditional on mi1, the event Z is independent of how mi was produced (i.e., whether mi
was obtained by work or fabrication). Indeed, as long as no one works, the distribution of
reports mj made by agents following i depends only on m
i
1, not on the signals that remain to
be discovered in the case. And as soon as someone works, then by definition Z has occurred.
Thus, what triggers the event Z (whenever it occurs) is a sequence of uninformative (until Z
occurs) reportsmj for agents following i, whose probability distribution is completely pinned
down by mi1.
From the previous lemmas, we have Pr(A ∩ Z|mi1) ≤ 2CgFˆ k
(
(1 + η)F ki − Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
for all
mi /∈ Ni and Pr(Ac|mi1) ≤ 1/
√
G for all mi /∈ Ti. Letting Mˆi = Mi \ (Ni ∪ Ti), this implies
that
Pr(Z|mi1) = Pr(Z ∩A|mi1) +Pr(Z ∩Ac|mi1) ≤
2Cg
Fˆ k
(
F ki (1 + η)− Ei+1[F kJ ]
)
+1/
√
G (27)
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for all mi ∈ Mˆi.
Conditional on A, F k+1j ≤ Gε for all j ≥ i. By definition of J , all continuation equilibria
until round J included are informative, which implies that F kj ≥ F k(F k+1j ) for all j ≤ J .
Since F k(·) is nonincreasing, this implies that F kj ≥ F k(Gε) = Fˆ k for all j ≤ J .
We thus have for mi ∈ Mˆi
Ei+1F
k
J = Pri+1(A)Ei+1[F kJ |A] + Pri+1(Ac)Ei+1[F kJ |Ac]
≥ Pri+1(A)Ei+1[F kJ |A]
≥ (1− 1/
√
G)Fˆ k.
By construction, F ki ≤ F¯ k + Fˆ kη and Fˆ k ≥ F¯ k − Fˆ kη and hence F ki − Fˆ k ≤ (F¯ k + Fˆ kη)−
(F¯ k − Fˆ kη) = 2ηFˆ k. Letting B = 8Cg, (27) then implies (for η ≤ 1/2, which we assume)
that for all mi in Mˆi
Pr(Z|mi1) ≤ Bη +
B
2
√
G
+ 1/
√
G. (28)
For eachmi, let V
f
i (mi|Zc) denote i’s expected gross utility if he sends messagemi conditional
on no j > i working and V f,∗ denote the maximizer of V fi (mi|Zc) over all messages mi ∈ Mˆi.
Notice that i’s expected gross utility conditional onmi and no j > i working does not depend
on whether i worked or shirked: either way, the subsequent reports {mj}j>i are independent
of the signals that remain to be discovered. Therefore, i’s conditional expected gross utilities
satisfy V w(mi|Zc) = V fi (mi|Zc).
Combining these observations with (26) and (28), we obtain
V w(mi) ≤
(
Bη +
B
2
√
G
+
1√
G
)
R + V f,∗,
for mi ∈ Mˆi. Combining this with (25) yields
V w ≤
(
1
2ηG2
+
1√
G
)
R +
(
Bη +
B
2
√
G
+
1√
G
)
R + V f,∗.
i’s utility from working thus satisfies
Uw ≤
(
1
2ηG2
+
1√
G
+ 2Bη +
B
2
√
G
+
1√
G
)
R + V f,∗ − c. (29)
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If i sends a message m∗i ∈ Mˆi that achieves V f,∗, his utility Uf satisfies
Uf ≥ Pr(Z|mi−11 , m∗i )× 0 + Pr(Zc|mi−11 , m∗i )V f,∗
≥
(
1−Bη − B
2
√
G
− 1√
G
)
V f,∗
≥ V f,∗ −
(
Bη − B
2
√
G
− 1√
G
)
R
where 0 is used as a lower bound on i’s realized gross utility to derive the second inequality.
Therefore, working is strictly suboptimal if(
1
2ηG2
+
1√
G
+Bη +
B
2
√
G
+
1√
G
)
R + V f,∗ − c < V f∗ − (Bη + B
2
√
G
+
1√
G
)R
or
c
R
>
1
2ηG2
+
3√
G
+ 2Bη +
B√
G
. (30)
This inequality is always satisfied as long as η is small enough and ηG is large enough.
In particular, since B = 8Cg, g = R/λc, and C can be taken to equal 2R/c if λ = 1
and 2R/(cλ(1 − λ)) as noted in Proposition 2, the inequality is satisfied if η = 1/√G and√
G = 128R3/c3 for λ = 1 and
√
G = 128R3/(c3λ2(1 − λ)) if λ < 1 (recalling that R > c),
in which case each term on the right-hand side of (30) is less than c/4R with some strict
inequalities. 
B Proof of Theorem 2
We construct compensation functions for which the strategy profile proposed constitutes an
equilibrium. Under this strategy profile, as long as pi lies in (p
¯
, p¯) all agents work and report
an informative signal about ω. Moreover, given the symmetric signal structure, pi depends
only on the number of “H” and “L” signals as long as all agents j < i work with probability
1. Therefore, the set of equilibrium posteriors forms a grid {qk} containing pˆ and containing
a single point on each side of (p
¯
, p¯). Let q0 ≤ p
¯
< q1, . . . , pˆ, . . . , qN < p¯ < qN+1 denote this
grid. Along the candidate equilibrium, the belief pi evolves on this grid until it hits either
q0 or qN+1, after which the investigation stops.
Let J denote the last investigator who works: we have pJ ∈ {q1, qN} and pJ+1 ∈ {q0, qN+1}.
Also let p˜ = pJ+1 denote the value of the belief when learning stops under the candidate
equilibrium.
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We construct utility functions in which an investigator’s compensation depends only on his
report and on the posterior p˜.
For any i such that pi = q
k ∈ (p
¯
, p¯), if i reports “H”, he gets a reward RkH ≥ 0 if p˜ = qN+1
and a punishment P kL ≤ 0 if p˜ = q0. If i reports “L”, he gets RkL ≥ 0 if p˜ = q0 and P kL ≤ 0 if
p˜ = qN+1.
For any p, q on the grid, let π(p, q) denote the probability that the belief sequence ends with
p˜ = qN+1, i.e., exits (p
¯
, p¯) through p¯, from the perspective of an agent who assigns probability
p to ω, but the prior used by investigators is p0 = q. That is, π(p, q) is the probability that
an individual with prior p assigns to the sequence pi converging to q
N+1 in equilibrium given
that the public belief, which serves as the state variable for the equilibrium, starts at q.
If i sends report “H” starting from prior pi = q
k, he assigns a probability π(qk, qk+1) to the
public belief converging to qN+1. If i works and receives report “H ′′, his belief about the
continuation equilibrium is π(qk+1, qk+1). Similarly, if i sends “L′′, his belief is π(qk, qk−1)
whereas if he works and reports “L′′ his belief is π(qk−1, qk−1). It is straightforward to verify
the inequalities
π(qk+1, qk+1) > π(qk, qk+1) (31)
and
π(qk−1, qk−1) < π(qk, qk−1), (32)
for all k ∈ [2, N − 1]. The strictness of the inequalities comes from the fact that conditional
on the true state ω, the dynamic of {pj}j≥i+1 starting any given value of pi+1 is strictly
increasing in ω in FOSD, as is easily checked. Therefore, the probability of hitting qN+1
before q0 is strictly increasing in the belief pi that the state is high.
For k = 1, the investigation stops if i reports “L” so (32) holds as an equality, but (31) is still
strict, because this report triggers further investigation. The reverse is true for k = N : (31)
only holds as an equality while (32) is strict.
If i shirks, his maximal utility is
max{π(qk, qk+1)RkH + (1− π(qk, qk+1))P kH ; π(qk, qk−1)P kL + (1− π(qk, qk−1))RkL}. (33)
The left argument is i’s expected payoff if he sends “H”, and the right one is his payoff if
he sends “L”. Since i can send either message at no cost, his best payoff from fabrication is
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the maximum of these two terms. If i works, he gets
zk[π(qk+1, qk+1)RkH + (1− π(qk, qk+1))P kH ] + (1− zk)[π(qk−1, qk−1)P kL + (1− π(qk−1,k−1 ))RkL]
(34)
where zk is the probability of receiving signal “H” given belief qk, and is equal to zk =
Pr(“H ′′|qk) = qkπ + (1− qk)× (1− π).
It is optimal for i to work if the expression in (34) exceeds the expression in (33) by at least
c.
This condition is obtained as follows: set P kH = P
k
L = −Q where Q is a strictly positive
constant, and let RkH = Q
1−π(qk,qk+1)
π(qk,qk+1)
and RkL = Q
π(qk,qk−1)
1−π(qk ,qk−1) . This guarantees that i’s
expected payoff from fabrication is zero, regardless of the outcome. From (31) and (32), his
payoff from working is of order Q and thus exceeds c, for Q high enough.48
If k = 1 or N , there is one signal that i can send after working which yields a payoff of order
Q, while the other signal yields 0. The signal associated with a positive payoff arises with a
probability that is bounded away from 0, since pi lies in (p
¯
, p¯).
Moreover this scheme is feasible as long as the maximal reward R and and punishment P
respectively exceed sup{Rkθ : θ ∈ {L,H}, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}} and Q.
General case
As noted, the argument extends easily to the case in which ρ and/or λ are less than 1.
With ρ < 1 and λ = 1, the informative equilibrium is identical to the one described in
Proposition 1 except that learning stops as soon as an agent fails to report evidence, in
which case he gets a zero compensation. By construction of the equilibrium in the proof
above, shirking and reporting that no evidence was found has the same value as fabricating
any other message and can thus be deterred. Since a working agent may find nothing, or
the learning process may be interrupted before the belief process exits (p
¯
, p¯), in which case
the working agent receives 0, the rewards and punishments must be scaled up by 1/πρ(q
k),
where πρ(q
k) is the probability that the belief process exits (p
¯
, p¯) in equilibrium, given the
current belief qk, so that the expected compensation of a working agent still exceeds the cost
48To see this, let p¯i denote a strictly positive lower bound on all inequalities (31) and (32) over all k’s
whenever they hold strictly. Then, the gain from working is of order Qp¯i.
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c of working.
If λ < 1 and ρ = 1, a working agent may fail to find evidence even when there surely exists
some. In this case, we again assume that the compensation is zero, which deters shirking and
reporting the empty message, and scale up all rewards and punishments by 1/λ to incentive
the agent to work, as in the previous paragraph. The belief process will surely exit (p
¯
, p¯)
since the amount of evidence is unlimited (only individual agents may be unlucky and find
nothing with probability 1− λ).
The case in which both λ and ρ are less than 1 is a convex combination of the previous cases
and addressed accordingly.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Without loss of generality, we again assume that agents’ gross utility functions {Vi}i∈N all
take values in [0, R].
For any round i, consider the event Qi that all past investigators whose may have failed to
discover signals, given the history mi−11 , have indeed failed to discover signals. Conditional
on Qi, the number qi of signals that have been uncovered until round i is equal to the number
of past witnesses plus the number of past investigators whose messages reveal that they have
surely discovered signals given mi−11 . Put differently, qi is the number of signals that have
been surely discovered by round i. Let Fˆ ki denote the probability that |Si| ≥ k conditional
on Qi and qi.
We observe that i) qi is nondecreasing along any equilibrium path and is strictly increasing
whenever a witness arrives, ii) given the construction of S, the distribution of Si conditional
on mi−11 and Qi is only a function of qi, iii) Fˆ k1 = F k1 for all k.
We will prove that there exist strictly positive thresholds {F
¯
k}k≥1 such that an informative
continuation equilibrium exists in round i only if Fˆ ki ≥ F¯
k for all k ≥ 1. Applied to i = 1,
this result implies Theorem 3. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1, the following inequalities hold: i) F ki ≤ Fˆ ki for all i, k ≥ 1,
and ii) Fˆ kj ≤ Fˆ ki for all j ≥ i and k ≥ 1.
Proof. Part i) Let ri denote the number of signals discovered by round i. We have ri ≥ qi
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and
F ki =
∑
r∈{qi,...,i−1}
Pr(ri = r|mi−11 )Pr(K˜ ≥ r + k| K˜ ≥ r)
≤
∑
r∈{qi,...,i−1}
Pr(ri = r|mi−11 )Pr(K˜ ≥ qi + k| K˜ ≥ qi)
=
∑
r∈{qi,...,i−1}
Pr(ri = r|mi−11 )Fˆ ki
= Fˆ ki .
The first equality comes from the independence of K˜ from S∞: ri is a sufficient statistic
for K˜ given all the information produced before round i, and only to the extent that it
reveals that K˜ ≥ ri. The inequality comes from the increasing hazard rate condition, which
implies that for any k ≥ 0, Pr(K˜ ≥ k + q | K˜ ≥ q) is non-increasing in q.49 The second
equality is due to the equality Fˆ ki = Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qi | K˜ ≥ qi), which again comes from the
independence of K˜ and S∞: the only relevant information about K˜ conditional on Qi is the
number of signals qi discovered by round i.
Part ii) For any j ≥ i, we have qj ≥ qi. As explained in the proof of Part i), we have for all
k ≥ 1
Fˆ kj = Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qj |K˜ ≥ qj)
≤ Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qi|K˜ ≥ qi)
= Fˆ ki ,
where the inequality comes from the increasing hazard rate property (see Footnote 49). 
The existence of thresholds {F
¯
k}k≥1 in the result mentioned above is proved by induction
on k. We start with the base case k = 1 and then prove the induction step.
C.1 Proof for k = 1
Suppose that Fˆ 1i < c/2R. Combining the two parts of Lemma 7, this implies that F
1
j < c/2R
for all j ≥ i. Lemma 1 still applies: no investigator j ≥ i works because the probability that
49See, e.g., Barlow et al. (1963, p. 379). In brief, a random variable X with distribution F has the
increasing hazard rate property if and only if the survival distribution F¯ = 1 − F is log-concave. This
property implies, as is easily checked, that for any p, q ≥ 0, Pr(X ≥ p + q|X ≥ p) = F¯ (p + q)/F¯ (p) is
decreasing in p.
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he finds something is too small to justify the cost of effort, given the maximal reward R.
We now show that if Fˆ 1i lies below another threshold, smaller than c/2R, witnesses provide
no informative message, either.
If i is a witness, we will use the following notation:
• βi: probability that i produces an informative message given mi−11 ;
• M+i : set of messages mi which are followed by an informative continuation equilibrium
(as in the case of investigators);
• Pri(Mi+): probability that i produces a message in M+i given mi−11 ;
• γi(mi): probability that i sends mi given mi−11 ;
• γi(mi|si): probability that i sends mi after observing si
Lemma 8 Consider L ≥ 2 pairwise independent random variables {Yℓ} with non-atomic
distributions over R and densities fℓ that are bounded above by f¯ . For any ε ≥ 0, let ELε
denote the event that ∃ℓ, ℓ′ ≤ L such that |Yℓ − Yℓ′| ≤ ε. Then
Pr(ELε ) ≤ L(L− 1)f¯ ε.
Proof. The result is proved by induction on L ≥ 2. For L = 2, we have
Pr(|Y − Y ′| ≤ ε) =
∫
R
fY (x)FY ′ [x− ε, x+ ε]dx ≤ 2εf¯
∫
R
fY (x)dx = 2εf¯ .
Now suppose that the claim holds for L−1. Notice that the event ELε is the union of L events:
the event EL−1ε concerning the first L − 1 random variables, and, for each ℓ ≤ L − 1, the
event Eℓ,L that the Lth random variable lies within ε of the ℓth random variable. Therefore,
Pr(ELε ) ≤ Pr(EL−1ε ) +
∑
ℓ≤L−1
Pr(|Yℓ − YL| ≤ ε)
≤ (L− 1)(L− 2)f¯ ε+ (L− 1)× 2εf¯
= L(L− 1)f¯ ε,
where the second inequality comes from the induction hypothesis and the fact that Pr(|Yℓ−
YL| ≤ ε) ≤ 2f¯ε, as shown in the first step of the induction for L = 2. 
Lemma 9 There exists a threshold F
¯
1 ∈ (0, c/2R) such that βi > 0 in some witness round i
only if Fˆ 1i ≥ F¯
1.
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Proof. Recall that if i is a witness, his message mi is informative (in equilibrium) if it is
statistically dependent of S conditional on mi−11 .
If i is a witness and has preference ǫ, his message is said to be ǫ-informative if there exist two
signals si 6= s′i such that the equilibrium distributions of mi conditional on i getting signals
si and s
′
i given i’s preference ǫ, are different across the two signals.
The following observation is straightforward to prove.
Observation 1 i’s message is informative if and only if the set of preference shocks ǫ for
which i’s message is ǫ-informative has positive probability.
For any equilibrium and round i in which i is a witness, let νi denote the probability that
i’s preference shock ǫi is such that i’s message is ǫi-informative.
For any F < c/2R, let ν(F ) denote the supremum of νi over all witness rounds i of all
equilibria such that Fˆ 1i ≤ F . We will show that ν(F ) = 0 for all F below some strictly
positive threshold.
Consider such an equilibrium. For any witness round i and message mi, let z(mi) denote the
probability that at least some j > i produces an informative message following message mi.
i’s expected utility if he receives signal si and sends message mi is given by
Ui(mi; si) = z(mi)Ei[Vi(m)|si, mi1] + (1− z(mi))V¯ i(mi) + ǫi(mi) (35)
where
V
¯ i
(mi) = Ei[Vi(m)|mi1, no j > i produces an informative message].
Notice that V
¯ i
(mi) does not depend on the signal si since this signal is payoff irrelevant
whenever no j > i produces an informative message.
Given ǫi, i sends an informative signal only if there exist mi 6= m′i and signals si 6= s′i such
that
Ui(mi; si) ≥ Ui(m′i; si)
and
Ui(m
′
i; s
′
i) ≥ Ui(mi; s′i)
From (35) and the fact that Vi(m) ∈ [0, R], this is possible only if
|ǫi(mi) + V
¯ i
(mi)− ǫi(m′i) + V¯ i(m
′
i)| ≤ R(z(mi) + z(m′i))
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The random variables Yℓ = ǫi(mℓ) + V
¯ i
(mℓ) satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 8. Letting
|M | denote the cardinality of the message space M , we thus have
Pr(i sends an informative message) ≤ |M |2f¯R(z(mi) + z(m′i)) (36)
Since no investigator j ≥ i works when Fˆ 1i < c/2R, we have for any message mi
z(mi) ≤
∑
j≥1
Pr(there are j witnesses in the sequence after round i, given message mi)jν(F ).
(37)
Indeed, by definition of ν(F ) and the fact that Fˆ 1j ≤ F for all j ≥ i, a witness provides
an informative signal with probability at most ν(F ). Thus jν(F ) is an upper bound on the
probability that at least one witness provides an informative signal given there are j such
witnesses.
The probability that at least j witnesses come after round i is bounded above by F j, where
j is an exponent (not a superscript). To show this for j = 1, notice that by Lemma 7,
Fˆ 1i+1 ≤ F , and the probability that there is at least one witness after round i is bounded
above by the probability F 1i+1 that there is at least one more signal, which is less than Fˆ
1
i+1
again by Lemma 7. For j = 2, note that conditional on the first witness arriving, Lemma 7
implies that the probability that a second witness arrives is again by bounded by F since
the probability that there remains another signal is bounded by F , and a witness can arise
only if such a signal exists. By induction, this shows that the probability of having at least
j witnesses and, hence, the probability of having exactly j witnesses, are bounded above by
F j. Combining this with (37) and using the standard formula
∑
j≥1 jx
j = x/(1− x)2 for all
x ∈ (0, 1), we get
z(mi) ≤
∑
j≥1
F jjν(F ) =
Fν(F )
(1− F )2 ,
Combining this with (36), we obtain
Pr(i sends an informative message | Fˆ 1i ≤ F ) ≤ 2|M |2f¯Rν(F )F/(1− F )2 (38)
Taking the supremum of the left-hand side over all witness rounds i and equilibria such that
Fˆ 1i ≤ F , we obtain
ν(F ) ≤ 2ν(F )|M |
2f¯RF
(1− F )2 .
For 2F/(1−F )2 ≤ 1/|M |2f¯R, this relation is possible only if ν(F ) = 0, because the function
on the right-hand side is a contraction of ν(F ). The function F/(1 − F )2 is increasing on
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[0, 1) and starts at zero. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a threshold F
¯
1 > 0 such
that ν(F ) = 0 for all F ≤ F
¯
1. 
C.2 Induction Step
Suppose that there exist strictly positive thresholds {F
¯
k′}k′∈{1,...,k} such that a continuation
equilibrium starting at round i is informative only if Fˆ k
′
i ≥ F¯
k′ for all k′ ≤ k. We will
show that a similar condition holds for k + 1. The proof works by contradiction: we will
suppose that for all ε ∈ (0, 1), there exists an informative continuation equilibrium such that
Fˆ k+1i ≤ ε and obtain an impossibility for ε small enough.
Consider any ε < F
¯
k × F
¯
1 and any informative continuation equilibrium starting at round
i such that Fˆ k+1i ≤ ε. Then, all continuation equilibria are uninformative as soon as the
witness j ≥ i arrives. To see this, suppose that some witness arrives at round j ≥ i. We
have for any message mj sent by this witness
Fˆ kj+1(mj) = Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qj + 1 | K˜ ≥ qj + 1)
=
Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qj + 1)
Pr(K˜ ≥ qj + 1)
≤ Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qi + 1)
Pr(K˜ ≥ qi + 1)
=
Pr(K˜ ≥ k + qi + 1)
Pr(K˜ ≥ qi)
Pr(K˜ ≥ qi)
Pr(K˜ ≥ qi + 1)
=
Fˆ k+1i
Fˆ 1i
,
where the inequality comes for the monotone hazard rate assumption (see Footnote 49) and
the fact that qj ≥ qi. Since the continuation equilibrium from round i is informative, we
must have Fˆ 1i ≥ F¯
1. Therefore, Fˆ k+1i ≤ ε < F¯
kF
¯
1 implies that
Fˆ kj+1 < F¯
k
which shows, by the induction hypothesis, that all continuation equilibria are uninformative
from round j + 1 onwards.
Moreover, the first witness, j, knowing that continuation equilibria are uninformative re-
gardless of his message, has no incentive to send an informative message.50
50Formally, the argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 9 except that here z(mi) = 0 regardless of the
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Therefore, if Fˆ k+1i ≤ ε, the only agents who may send informative messages are the investi-
gators arriving between round i and the arrival of the first witness. The situation is therefore
almost identical to the setting of Theorem 1, in the absence of witnesses, except that any se-
quential learning activity is interrupted at the apparition of the first witness. We know from
Theorem 1 that such equilibria can be informative only if F k+1i exceeds the k + 1-threshold
given by Theorem 1, which we denote here F˜ k+1. Since F k+1i ≤ Fˆ k+1i by Part i) of Lemma 7,
letting F
¯
k+1 = min{F˜ k+1i , F¯
kF
¯
1} we conclude that no informative continuation equilibrium
exists in round i if Fˆ k+1i ≤ F¯
k+1. This concludes the induction step.
message.
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